Pragmatics

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ИМО

Pragmatics

Pragmatics is a branch of general linguistics like other branches that include:

Phonetics, Phonology, Morphology, Syntax and Semantics

(Well, who knows….)

Stages of utterance production and processing: Invention; censorship; elocution; locution; illocution; per-locution.

Language in context; cultural values; shared knowledges; dialogue; negotiating meaning.

Geoffrey Leech Politeness principle:
1 The tact maxim;
2 The generosity maxim;
3 The approbation maxim;
4 The modesty maxim;
5 The agreement maxim;
6 The sympathy maxim.
Politeness; indirectness; Speech tactics; FTA; Positive and negative politeness etc.

Gricean Cooperative Principle; Speakers statuses and roles; Algorithms of Conversation; small talk; turn-taking; strategic approach; speech rituals.

Communicative Event

Speech ACTS

Intention; Speaker's Meaning

PRAGMA TICS

Politeness Critique oblique FTA

Conversation Grammar

pre-supposition, implicature, Inference

"The limits of my language are the limits of my world."

Ludwig Wittgenstein

WORD MEANING = WORD IN USE

WHEREOF ONE CANNOT SPEAK, THEREOF ONE MUST BE SILENT

LUDWIG WITTGENSTEIN

IF WE SPOKE A DIFFERENT LANGUAGE, WE WOULD PERCEIVE A SOMEWHAT DIFFERENT WORLD.

BECAUSE THE LIMITS OF MY LANGUAGE MEAN THE LIMITS OF MY WORLD.

~LUDWIG WITTGENSTEIN

Wittgenstein, Ludwig Josef Johann (1889–1951)

Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus

Logisch-philosophische Abhandlung

/By Ludwig Wittgenstein/

https://people.umass.edu/klement/tlp/tlp.pdf

Wittgenstein, Ludwig Josef Johann (1889–1951)

Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus, 1921

Wittgenstein, Ludwig Josef Johann (1889–1951)

Wittgenstein came up with the idea of "don't ask for the meaning, ask for the use," showing language as a new vehicle for social activity. Speech act theory hails from Wittgenstein's philosophical theories. Wittgenstein believed meaning derives from **pragmatic tradition**, demonstrating the importance of how language is used to accomplish objectives within specific situations. By following rules to accomplish a goal, communication becomes a set of language games. Thus, utterances do more than reflect a meaning, they are words designed to get things done.

Discourse Analysis /flashback /

➤ Pragmatics is concerned with how the interpretation of language depends on knowledge of the real world.

➤ It is interested in what people mean by what they say.

What is Pragmatics??

❑ Pragmatics is the branch of linguistics that looks at what you actually say:

➢ *your utterances*.

❑ Linguists study how what you say relates to the **communicative situation** or **context** you're in and how the context can be changed by what you say — all in order to find the rules that you, as a speaker, use when talking to other people.

What is Pragmatics??

❑ Pragmatics comes from Greek pragmatikos. The word stem pragmat- means 'deed'.

❑ Pragmatics looks at the deeds of language: utterances.

❑ Linguists who study pragmatics are called **pragmaticists**.

What is Pragmatics??

❑ Pragmatics in the large sense can be traced to two sources.

❑ The work of the philosophers Paul Grice (on the logic of conversation) together with J. L. Austin and John Searle (on speech acts) is the basis of formal pragmatics.

❑ The work of sociologist Harvey Sacks (on talking as social interaction) is the basis of conversation analysis.

Pragmatics
[prægmæ̱tɪks]

Pragmatics is the study of language from the point of view of users, especially the choices they make, the constraints they encounter in using language in social interaction and the effect their use of language has on other participants in the act of communication.

/ David Krystal (1985)

Pragmatics
[prægmæ_tɪks]

is the branch of linguistics dealing with language in use and the contexts in which it is used, including such matters as deixis, taking turns in conversation, text organization, presupposition, and implicature

Pragmatics
[prægmæ̠tɪks]

is the branch of linguistics that deals
with the meanings and effects

which come from

the use of language

in particular situations.

Pragmatics
[prægmæ̠tɪks]

1) is the study of those aspects of language that cannot be considered in isolation from its use;

2) is the study of the relation between symbols and those who use them.

Pragmatics: flashback

The **early pragmatics** was just a branch of semiology that was under the philosophers' studies, which means that pragmatics originates from the philosophers' studies on language.

Pragmatics: flashback

In Western tradition, pragmatics originates from the following aspects:
(1) the studies of semiology;
(2) the studies of linguistic philosophy in the 20th century and (3) the studies of function linguistics on language forms.

Pragmatics: flashback

American philosopher and semiotician Charles William Morris (1901 – 1979) in 1938 had divided semiology into **three parts:** syntactics, semantics and pragmatics.

Pragmatics: flashback

Charles Morris's
famous definition of pragmatics was
"the study of the relation of signs to interpreters".

Pragmatics: flashback

The term 'pragmatics' was introduced by Charles Morris, a philosopher. Morris contrasts *pragmatics* with *semantics* and *syntax*.

Pragmatics: flashback

He claims that syntax is the study of the grammatical relations of linguistic units to one another and the grammatical structures of phrases and sentences that result from these grammatical relation;

Pragmatics: flashback

❑ semantics is the study of the relation of linguistic units to the objects they denote,

❑ pragmatics is the study of the relation of linguistic units to people who communicate.

Pragmatics: flashback

The famous philosopher Carnap had very similar ideas with Morris:

Pragmatics: flashback

Morris held an opinion that the studies of pragmatics must involve the aspects of society, of psychology, of nerve, of culture and of other things that affected the **symbols** and their **meanings**.

Pragmatics: flashback

1. Carnap made the aims of pragmatics studies more specific, that is the relationship between language users and words and the reference relationship.

Pragmatics: flashback

1. Carnap thought that the studies of pragmatics should be on the relationship between users and words as well as the reference of words.

Pragmatics: flashback

2. Carnap divided studies into pure theoretic ones and descriptive ones.

Pragmatics: flashback

Bar-Hiller, the student of Carnap, suggested that the studies of pragmatics should have definite aims and he claimed that the definite aims should be on deicitics such as "I", "Here", "Now".

Pragmatics: flashback

The idea of speech acts has its roots in the Philosophy of Language. J. A. Austin wanted to capture the fact that there is more in the function of language than semantics.

Pragmatics: flashback

Traditionally, mapping of entities of a proposition onto referents and defining the truth value of a proposition was the major area of interest in language semantics.

Pragmatics: flashback

Austin and Searle put forward the **Speech Act Theory**, which was the most influent topic in the studies of pragmatics during the **second stage**.

Pragmatics: flashback

Austin and Searle put forward the **Speech Act Theory**, which was the most influent topic in the studies of pragmatics during the second stage.

The three Stages in the Development of Pragmatics

O **The first stage** is from the late 1930s to late 1940s, during this period, some philosophers such as Pierce, Morris and Carnap considered pragmatics to be a branch of semiology within the domain of philosophy.

O **The second stage** is from the beginning of 1950s to late 1960s. During this period, Austin, Searle and Grice made studies on *speech act* and *implicature theory*, and their achievements sustained the basic theory of pragmatics.

O **The third stage** starts after 1970s, when pragmatics became an independent discipline.

Pragmatics: flashback

Levinson's consideration of pragmatics was "the study of those **relations between language and context** that is grammaticalized, or encoded in the structure of a language.".

Pragmatics: flashback

Mey's definition was "Pragmatics studies the use of language in human communication as determined by the conditions of society.".

Pragmatics: flashback

Ran Yongping expressed his idea in his book A Survey of Pragmatics :

Pragmatics: flashback

: "Pragmatics is a discipline not only concerning the sense, but also concerning the derivation of sense and the understanding of underlying meaning as its objects.

Pragmatics: more definitions

1."Pragmatics

is the study of speaker meaning"

Pragmatics:
more definitions

2.“Pragmatics is the study of contextual meaning”

Pragmatics:
more definitions

3.“Pragmatics is the study of how more gets communicated than is said”.

Pragmatics: more definitions

4." Pragmatics is the study of the expression of relative distance."

(Yule:2008).

Pragmatics: more definitions

1."Pragmatics is the study of speaker meaning."2: " Pragmatics is the study of contextual meaning"3:" Pragmatics is the study of how more gets communicated than is said"4:" Pragmatics is the study of the expression of relative distance." (Yule:2008).

Four Key Aspects of Signification

According to American semiotician [ˌsɛmɪəˈtɪʃən]
Charles William Morris (1901 – 1979), symbols have three types of relations, meanwhile Roman Jackobson and Georg Klaus add another one.

Four Key Aspects of Signification

to objects	"Semantics"
to persons	"Pragmatics"
to other symbols (on the axis of combination)	"Syntactics"
to other symbols (on the axis of selection)	"Sigmatics"

to objects	[səˈmæntiks]
to persons	[prægˈmætɪks]
to other symbols (on the axis of combination)	[sɪnˈtæktɪks]
to other symbols (on the axis of selection)	[sɪgˈmætɪks]

Syntax addresses the formal relations of signs to one another, semantics deals with the relation of signs to what they denote, and pragmatics has a big deal with the relation of signs to their users and interpreters.

Pragmatics

O Speaker's **intention** is based on
description of <u>language</u>
and analysis of <u>texts</u>
and <u>communicative event</u>.

Communicative event constituents

Context

Message

Addresser--------------------Addressee

or Sender [kən'saɪnə]--------[ˌædre'siː]

Contact

Code

Communicative functions of Language

Referential

Poetic

Emotive ------------------- Conative

[or Expressive] -------   Manipulative

Phatic

Metalingual

Pragmatics

O Context based speech / discourse analysis;

Pragmatics

O Conversational analysis;

Pragmatics

O **Illocutive power** of speaker's expressions;

O **Perlocutive effect** of speech;

Pragmatics

O Speech acts theory;

Pragmatics

O Performatives;

Pragmatics

O Personal deixis in conversation and interpersonal interaction;

Pragmatics

O Oblique ways of conveying meaning in conversation and text construction.

Pragmatics studies

Implicit meanings of the text:

O presuppositions,

O implications,

O inferences.

Pragmatics

o **A language-game** (German: *Sprachspiel*) is a philosophical **concept** developed by Ludwig Wittgenstein, referring to simple examples of language use and the actions into which the language is woven.

Pragmatics pays attention to:

o The roles, statuses and repertories

of the communicator

in conversation or dialogue.

Pragmatics pays attention to acts:

o **"You're fired!"** expresses both the employment status of the individual in question, as well as the action by which said person's employment is ended.

o **"I hereby appoint you as chairman"** expresses both the status of the individual as chairman, and is the action which promotes the individual to this position.

Speech Acts :

What is a Speech Act?
An action performed in saying something. We perform speech acts when we offer an apology, greeting, request, complaint, invitation, compliment, or refusal. A speech act is an utterance that serves a function in communication.
A speech act might contain just one word, as in "Sorry!" to perform an apology (???).

Theory of Speech Acts

| Desire | | Effect |
| Illocution | specific words -locution | perlocution |

A speech act has 3 aspects:

- **locution** = physical utterance by the speaker
- **illocution** = the intended meaning of the utterance by the speaker (performative)
- **prelocution** = the action that results from the locution

Alice told Tom   Would you please close the door

J. Austin - How to do things with words, 1962.
J. Searle - Speech acts, 1969.

illocution

[ˌɪləˈkjuːʃ(ə)n]

is an act of speaking or writing which in itself effects or constitutes the intended action,

e.g. ordering, warning, or promising.

illocution

[ˌɪləˈkjuːʃ(ə)n]

Is an act performed by a speaker by virtue of uttering certain words, as for example the acts of promising or of threatening

Also called: illocutionary act.

Illocution

The illocutionary act is not in one-to-one correspondence with the locution from which it is derived.

There are different locutions that express the same illocution and vice-versa.

Illocution

For example, there are *indirect speech* acts, that is acts with a different force than the obviously deducible one.

A typical example is the locution of the utterance ***"Could you pass the salt?"*** uttered at a dinner table.

Illocution

For a speaker of English in the particular situation this means *''Pass the salt, please''* and no one would assume that the speaker is indeed interested in whether the addressee would be able to pass the salt.

perlocution
[ˌpɜːlɒˈkjuːʃən]

is an act of speaking or writing which has an action as its aim but which in itself does not effect or constitute the action, for example persuading or convincing

Compare with illocution

perlocution
[ˌpɜːlɒˈkjuːʃən]

is the effect that someone has by uttering certain words, such as frightening a person

Also called: perlocutionary act

performative
[pəˈfɔːmətɪv]

is relating to or denoting an utterance by means of which the speaker performs a particular act

e.g., 'I bet', 'I apologize', 'I promise'.
Often contrasted with constative

performative
[pəˈfɔːmətɪv]

Verbs that name the speech act that they intend to effect are called *Performatives* .

constative
[ˈkɒnstətɪv, kənˈsteɪtɪv]

is an adjective denoting a speech act or sentence that is a statement declaring something to be the case.

E.g. 'It's been raining since early morning'.
Often contrasted with performative

For example, 'I confess that I was there' is itself a confession, and so is performative in the narrower sense.

a performative verb, sentence, or utterance

1. a. denoting an utterance that constitutes some act, esp the act described by the verb.

a performative verb, sentence, or utterance

For example, 'I confess that I was there' is itself a confession, and so is performative in the narrower sense, while *'I'd like you to meet ...'* (effecting an introduction) is performative only in the looser sense

a performative verb, sentence, or utterance

2) a) denoting a *verb* that may be used as the main verb in such an utterance

b) (as *noun*) "promise" is a performative.

a performative verb, sentence, or utterance

A performative uttered by the right person under the right circumstances has as a result a change in the world.

a performative verb, sentence, or utterance

Performative utterances are those uses of language, often involving some **ritual ['rɪtjuəl], [-ʧuə-] aspect**, which are themselves a kind of action and whose very utterance brings about some result.

a performative verb, sentence, or utterance

For example, ``*I pronounce you husband and wife"* uttered <u>by a priest</u>, <u>in the church</u> with all the legal and traditional aspects being settled, will have the **actual effect** of the couple referred to being husband and wife after the performative has taken place

Exercise: Performance Sentences?

a) I testify that she met the agent.
b) I know that she met the agent.
c) I suppose the Yankees will win.
d) I bet her $2500 that Clinton would lose the election.
e) I teach the class.
f) We promise to leave early.
g) We owe Revenue Canada 1, 000, 000.
h) I bequeath $ 100, 000 to ABU.
i) I swore I didn't do it.
j) I swear I didn't do it.
k) I hereby sentence you for life after all the charges against you have been proven true...

a performative verb, sentence, or utterance

- ✓ I bet you five dollars that the Canadians win.
- ✓ I challenge you to a match.
- ✓ I nominate John for president.
- ✓ I promise to improve.
- ✓ I resign!
- ✓ I hereby ….

More examples of performatives

- ✓ I divorce thee, I divorce thee, I divorce thee.
- ✓ I congratulate you.
- ✓ I challenge you to a duel.
- ✓ The United States does hereby declare war on Japan.
- ✓ I urge you to vote yes on the reform bill.
- ✓ We the jury do hereby find the defendant guilty of murder.
- ✓ I'm sorry.

a performative verb, sentence, or utterance

☞ *The word hereby shows that the speaker intends to accomplish something in virtue of saying something*

I hereby ... Illocutionary Acts Performative Verbs

a performative verb, sentence, or utterance

- ✓ The earth is round.
- ✓ I bet you sixpence it will rain tomorrow.....
- ✓ I promise to pay you five bucks tomorrow.
- ✓ India won independence in 1947.
- ✓ I name this ship Queen Elizabeth.

Explicit vs. Primary Performatives

Explicit performance:

I apologize. I approve. (All in favor say Aye...) Aye. Welcome (I bid you).

Half performance, half description:

I am sorry. I approve of that decision. I welcome you.

Descriptive statement:

I am disgusted by your behavior.
I feel approval for that idea. I wish to welcome you.

Later Criticism of Performatives

Problems with this simple distinction.

You can draw up a list of performative verbs:

- I promise, I order, I declare

- but you can't limit performative language to only those verbs.

Later Criticism of Performatives

There are some implicit performatives:

"I will pay you tomorrow." Can become a promise to pay.

"Stop!" Can be "short" for "I order you to stop."

"There is a cat on the mat."

Can be come the performative "I affirm that there is a cat on the mat."

Constative utterances also perform actions – they state, affirm, describe.

Theory of Speech Acts

Austin modified his theory during his lectures considerably.

At the end of his lectures, he replaces his performative/constative distinction with a more general theory of speech acts, stating that "the traditional 'statement' is an abstraction, an ideal" (Austin 1962: 148).

Theory of Speech Acts

Performative verbs as criteria for classifying speech acts are replaced by types of illocutionary force which are associated with an utterance. The notion of 'performative', which was based on the performative/constative distinction, has thus been replaced with more general families of related and overlapping speech-acts (Austin 1962: 150). Austin distinguishes five general classes of utterances which are classified according to their illocutionary force:

J. R Searle Speech Act Classification

Commissive	Declarative	Directive	Expressive	Representative
a speech act that commits the speaker to doing something in the future, such as a promise or a threat.	a speech act which changes the state of affairs in the world.	a speech act that has the function of getting the listener to do something, such as a suggestion, a request, or a command.	a speech act in which the speaker expresses feelings and attitudes about something, such as an apology, a complaint, or to thank someone, to congratulate someone.	a speech act which describes states or events in the world, such as an assertion, a claim, a report.
Ex.: If you don't stop fighting I'll call the police, (threat) I'll take you to the movies tomorrow. (promise)	Ex.: During the wedding ceremony the act of marriage is performed when the phrase I now pronounce you man and wife is uttered.	Ex.: Please sit down. Why don't you close the window?	Ex.: The meal was delicious.	Ex.: This is a German car. (the assertion)

Indirect Speech Acts

Indirect speech acts

When a sentence characterized by formal features of some pragmatic type in speech acquires illocutionary power of sentences of another type.

Indirect Speech Acts

Indirect speech acts are commonly used to reject proposals and to make requests.

Ex.:

A speaker asks, "Would you like to meet me for coffee?" and another replies, "I have class."

The second speaker used an *indirect speech act* to reject the proposal. This is indirect because the *literal meaning* of "/ have class" does not entail any sort of rejection.

Indirect Speech Acts

We may always deny that a particular perlocutionary act was intended by saying things like:

Didn't mean to embarrass you.
I was simply stating a fact.

implicature
[ˈɪmplɪˌkətʃə, -ˌkeɪtʃə]

The English philosopher H. Paul Grice (1913-1988) introduced the notion of 'conversational implicatures' which are implications deduced by speakers during conversations.

implicature
[ˈɪmplɪˌkətʃə, -ˌkeɪtʃə]

(mass noun)

is the action of implying a meaning beyond the literal sense of what is explicitly stated,

for example saying 'The frame is nice'

and implying ...

implicature
[ˈɪmplɪˌkətʃə, -ˌkeɪtʃə]

(mass noun)

is the action of implying a meaning beyond the literal sense of what is explicitly stated,

for example saying 'The frame is nice'

and implying 'I don't like the picture in it'.

implicature
[ˈɪmplɪˌkətʃə, -ˌkeɪtʃə]

"Implicature" refers to what is suggested in an utterance, even though not expressed nor strictly implied by the utterance.

"Have you stopped going to the gym?"

implicature
[ˈɪmplɪˌkətʃə, -ˌkeɪtʃə]

generates inferences beyond the semantic content of the sentences uttered.

Implicature:"Implicature" refers to what is suggested in an utterance, even though not expressed nor strictly implied by the utterance.

Speech Act Theory

❑Speech acts serve their function once they are said or communicated.

❑These are commonly taken to include acts such as apologizing, promising, ordering, answering, requesting, complaining, warning, inviting, refusing, and congratulating.

Speech Act Theory

❑ Speech act theory (John L. Austin) broadly explains that

❑ utterances (or speech acts) have three parts or aspects:

1) Locutionary act /loʊkyuʃənɛri/
2) Illocutionary act /ɪləkyuʃənɛri/
3) Perlocutionary act /pɜrləkyuʃənɛri/

❑The key word here is act! We do "things" when we speak!

Speech Act Theory

Austin identified three different uses of any speech act:

❑ Locutionary ☞ The utterance conveys a **proposition** with ordinary meaning. The proposition has a **truth-value** (i.e. is either true or false).

❑ Illocutionary ☞ Informing, ordering, warning : The utterance has a certain conventional force.

❑ Perlocutionary ☞ The utterance brings about or achieves a state of affairs in virtue of the saying of it.

Speech Act Theory

❑ Locutionary acts:

simply the speech that has taken place

❑ Illocutionary force:

    are the real actions which are performed by the utterance.

In other words : where saying equals doing.

E.g.: betting, pleading, declaration, welcoming, warning, etc.

❑ Perlocutionary force:

are the effects of the utterance on the listener:

    I hereby …

    /John L. Austin/

Speech Act Theory

❑ According to Kent Bach, "almost any speech act is really the performance of several acts at once, distinguished by different aspects of the speaker's intention:

I. There is the act of saying something,

II. what one does in saying it, such as requesting or promising,

III. and how one is trying to affect one's audience".

Three Speech Act Phases

Speech acts can be analysed on **three levels:**

❑ A locutionary act: the performance of an utterance: the actual utterance and its apparent meaning, comprising any and all of its verbal, social, and rhetorical meanings, all of which correspond to the verbal, syntactic and semantic aspects of any meaningful utterance;

Three Speech Act Phases

❑an illocutionary act: the active result of the implied request or meaning presented by the locutionary act. For example, if the locutionary act in an interaction is the question "Is there any salt?" the implied illocutionary request is "Can someone pass the salt to me?";

Three Speech Act Phases

and in certain cases

a further perlocutionary act:

❑the actual effect of the locutionary and illocutionary acts, such as persuading, convincing, scaring, enlightening, inspiring, or otherwise getting someone to do or realize something, whether intended or not.

Pre-Speech Act Theory

❑ Ludwig Josef Johann Wittgenstein (1889 – 1951)/ˈvɪtgənʃtaɪn, -staɪn/;Austria, - Cambridge

❑ Wittgenstein came up with the idea of "don't ask for the meaning, ask for the use," showing *language as a new vehicle for social activity*.

Pre-Speech Act Theory

- Wittgenstein believed meaning derives from pragmatic tradition, demonstrating the importance of how language is used to accomplish objectives within specific situations.

- By following rules to accomplish a goal, communication becomes a set of language games.

- Thus, utterances do more than reflect a meaning, they are words designed to get things done.

Pre-Speech Act Theory

❑ The term 'social act' and some of the theory of this sui generis type of linguistic action are to be found in the fifth of Thomas Reid's Essays on the Active Powers of the Human Mind (1788, chapter VI, Of the Nature of a Contract).

❑ https://archive.org/details/essaysontheintel007938mbp/page/n69/mode/2up

❑ The term "Speech Act" had also been already used by Karl Bühler.

Speech Act Theory

❑ John Langshaw Austin (1911 – 1960) was a British philosopher of language, who wrote and published the famous book 'How to do things with words' (1962, Lectures of 1955, 169 p.).

❑ Why wouldn't you try to read it?

Speech Act Theory

❑ **Speech act theory** is a subfield of pragmatics that studies how words are used not only to present information but also to carry out actions.

Speech Act Theory

❑ John Langshaw Austin (1911 – 1960) was a British philosopher of language, who wrote and published the famous book

❑ Austin J. L. How to do things with words. Cambridge, 1962., 169 p.).

Speech Act Theory

❑ Austin noted that not only were sentences used to report of statements but some sentences must be treated as the performance of an act.

Speech Act Theory

❑ In 1955 John L. Austin gave lectures at Harvard University (William James Lectures) which were published in 1962 as 'How to Do Things with Words and Speech Acts'.

❑ Though Austin is said to the founder of Speech Act Theory it is John R. Searle's book, incorporating Austin's work published in 1969 entitled 'An Essay in the Philosophy of Language' which has been the more influential in development of a Speech Act Theory.

Speech Act Theory

❑ There is a significant difference between the two conceptions: whereas Austin emphasized the *conventional* interpretation of speech acts,

❑ Searle emphasized a *psychological* interpretation (based on beliefs, intentions, etc.).

Speech Act Theory

Speech Act Theory

John Langshaw Austin

John Rogers Searle
/sɜːrl/

Speech Act Theory

O Vanderveken (1981 and 1983) with J. Searle (1985) furthered Austin's Speech Act Theory with the proposition that the three main components of sentence meaning are the illocutionary forces, senses, and denotations. (Vanderveken p.195). Searle deals with illocutionary acts in the context of philosophy of language (Crosby, 1990). His social action of speech acts can be reduced to one of promising. Promising as in intent is an act of sincerity. In a chatroom sincerity is the smallest equation of meaning exchange.

Felicity Conditions

❑ In J. L. Austin's formulation of speech act theory, a performative utterance is neither true nor false, but can instead be deemed "felicitous" or "infelicitous" according to a set of conditions whose interpretation differs depending on whether the utterance in question is

❑ a *declaration* ("I sentence you to death"),

❑ a *request* ("I ask that you stop doing that") or

❑ a *warning* ("I warn you not to jump off the roof").

"Conditions for happy performatives"

Felicity Conditions

In his second lecture "Conditions for happy performatives" (1976:12-24), Austin identifies a set of rules which govern the felicitous or 'successful' use of performative utterances. These 'felicity conditions' apply especially to performatives associated with specific rituals or other types of formal events (cf. Thomas 1997:37). According to Austin (1976: 14f), the following conditions must be met for a performative sentence to be successful:

Felicity Conditions

Felicity Conditions for the speech act of promising are:

- ✓ I say I will perform an action in the future.
- ✓ I intend to do it.
- ✓ I believe I can do it.
- ✓ I think I would not do it anyway in the normal course of my actions.
- ✓ I think the other person wants me to do it.
- ✓ I intend to place myself under an obligation by the act of promising.
- ✓ We both understand what I am saying.
- ✓ We are both normal, conscious human beings.
- ✓ Both of us are in normal circumstances (e.g. not performing in a play).The utterance contains some <u>illocutionary force </u>indicating device which is only uttered <u>if all the appropriate conditions hold</u>.

"Conditions for happy performatives"

A.1 "There must exist an <u>accepted conventional procedure</u> having a certain conventional effect, that procedure to include the uttering of certain words by certain persons in certain circumstances, and further,

A.2 the particular <u>persons and circumstances</u> in a given case must be <u>appropriate</u> for the invocation of the particular procedure invoked.

B.1 The procedure must be executed by all participants both <u>correctly</u> and

B.2 <u>Completely</u>.

"Conditions for happy performatives"

Felicity Conditions

C.1 Where, as often, the procedure is designed for use by persons having certain thoughts or feelings, or for the inauguration of certain consequential conduct on the part of any participant, then <u>a person participating in and so invoking the procedure must in fact have those thoughts of feelings</u>, and the participants must intend so to conduct themselves, and further C.2 must actually so <u>conduct themselves subsequently</u>." (Austin 1976: 14f)

Felicity Conditions Violations

Misfires

The conditions under A and B are essential to the first group of infelicities which Austin calls **"Misfires."** (Austin: 1976: 16) Not observing these rules makes the act invalid, so that it does not take effect. For example, if a husband says to his wife 'I divorce you', this is an infelicitous speech act because one cannot get divorced by oneself, so the utterance does not have a conventional effect. Another example occurs if speaker A says: 'I bet you sixpence' but speaker B doesn't say 'I take you on.'

Felicity Conditions Violations

Abuses

The conditions listed under C – when violated – make the professed act an abuse of the procedure. Austin states that such performances are not void but **"unhappy."** (Austin 1976: 15, 43) For example, when the speaker says "I congratulate you", although the speaker does not have the requisite feelings. (Austin 1976: 41)

Felicity Conditions

❑ **Felicity conditions** are conditions necessary to the success of a speech act.

❑ They are conditions needed for success or achievement of a performative.

❑ Loosely speaking, felicity conditions are of the kinds:

      a) preparatory conditions,

      b) conditions for execution,

      c) sincerity conditions,

      d) essential conditions.

      (J. Searle, Speech Acts, pp. 60 ff.).

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Felicity Conditions

FC are the circumstances under which it would be appropriate to interpret something as a particular type of speech act.

1. General conditions

2. Content conditions

3. Preparatory condition

4. Sincerity condition

5. Essential condition

Felicity Conditions

❑ When I promise to mow your lawn, <u>the preparatory conditions</u> are that you want me to mow your lawn and that I believe that this is the case and that neither of us believes that I would in any case mow your lawn as part of the normal course of events;

❑ the <u>propositional conditions</u> are that my utterance 'I promise to mow your lawn' predicates the right sort of act on my part;

❑ the <u>sincerity condition</u> is that I truly do intend to mow your lawn;

❑ and the <u>essential condition</u> is that my utterance counts as an undertaking on my part to perform this action.

Felicity Conditions

❑ **Conventionality of procedure:** the procedure (e.g. an <u>oath</u>) follows its conventional form.

❑ **Appropriate participants and circumstances:** the participants are able to perform a *felicitous speech act* under the circumstances (e.g. a judge can sentence a criminal in court, but not on the street).

❑ **Complete execution:** the speaker completes the speech act without errors or interruptions.

Felicity Conditions

"I promise to see you tomorrow'.

❑ General conditions:

The utterance is understood.

❑ Content conditions:

The content of the utterance is about a future event and the speaker is committed to the act.

❑ Preparatory conditions:

The event does not happen by itself. The event will have a beneficial effect.

❑ Sincerity conditions:

The speaker does have a genuine intention to carry out the future act.

❑ Essential conditions: The utterance changes the speaker's state from non-obligation to obligation.

Felicity Conditions

Possible Causes of Infelicity in a Speech Act

a. misfire act – purported but void;

b. abuse act – professed but hollow;

c. misinvocation act – disallowed;

d. misexecution act – has flaws or hitches.

Felicity Conditions

Austin distinguished three broad categories of infelicities:

A. <u>Misinvocations,</u> which disallow a purported act.

For example, a random individual saying the words of the marriage ceremony is disallowed from performing it. Similarly, no purported speech act of banishment can succeed in our society because such an act is not allowed within it.

B. <u>Misexecutions,</u> in which the act is vitiated by errors or omissions, including examples in which an appropriate authority pronounces a couple man and wife, but uses the wrong names or fails to complete the ceremony by signing the legal documents. Here, as in the case of misinvocations, the purported act does not take place.

C. <u>Abuses,</u> where the act succeeds, but the participants do not have the ordinary and expected thoughts and feelings associated with the happy performance of such an act. Insincere promises, mendacious findings of fact, unfelt congratulations, apologies, etc. come under this rubric. .

Felicity Conditions

Propositions and Entailments vs. Speech Acts and Implicatures

A: The cat is on the mat.

B: Do you really think so? I thought I saw the cat on the couch!

A: Well, I just said that the cat is on the mat. It is really on the couch.

- B draws the implicature that A believes the proposition that the cat is on the mat because A has uttered the sentence 'The cat is on the mat'.

But the proposition is not in fact entailed merely by A's speech act.

- A then cancels the implicature that he believes the proposition..

Searle: Constitutive Rules

"Speaking a language is performing acts according to rules" (Searle 1969:36-7),

By "rule" Searle he means a conventional association between a certain kind of act and its socially determined consequences. These are **CONSTITUTIVE RULES**, he said, in the same sense that the rules of

chess are constitutive of the game itself.

Pre-condtions:	Assert	Thank (for)	Warn
1.Propositional content	Any proposition p	Past act A done by H	Future event or state etc. E=EVENT
2.Preparatory	1. S has evidence (reasons, etc.) for the truth of p. 2. It is not obvious to both S and H that H knows (does not need to be reminded of, etc.)	A benefits S and S believes A benefits S.	1. H has reason to believe E will occur and is not in H's interest. 2. It is not obvious to both S and H that E will occur.
2.Sincerity	S believes p .	S feels grateful or appreciative for A.	S believes E is not in H's best interest.
4. Essential	Counts as an undertaking that p represents an actual state of affairs.	Counts as an expression of gratitude or appreciation.	Counts as an undertaking to the effect that E is not in H's best interest.

Note that violations of Searle's preparatory conditions produce infelicities of Austin's type A, misinvocations. Violations of the sincerity conditions correspond more or less directly to Austin's class Γ of infelicities, the abuses that do not nullify or vitiate the illocutionary act but

Speech Act Classification by John Austin

❑ • Verdictives: giving a verdict, estimate, appraisal etc.

❑ • Excersitives: exercising of power, rights or influence, advising, warning etc.

❑ • Commissives: promising or undertaking, they commit you to doing something etc.;

❑ • Behabitives: which have to do with social behaviour and attitudes, apologizing, congratulating, commending, condoling, cursing etc.;

❑ • Expositives: I argue, I concede, I illustrate – could be classed as metalinguistic;

There could be marginal cases, they could overlap.

Speech Act Classification by John Austin

1.	VERDICTIVES:	acts that consist of delivering a finding, e.g., acquit, hold (as a matter of law), read something as, etc.
2.	EXERCITIVES	acts of giving a decision for or against a course of action, e.g., appoint, dismiss, order, sentence, etc.
3.	COMMISSIVES:	acts whose point is to commit the speaker to a course of action, e.g., contract, give one's word, declare one's intention, etc.
4.	BEHABITIVES:	expressions of attitudes toward the conduct, fortunes or attitudes of others, e.g., apologize, thank, congratulate, welcome, etc.
5.	EXPOSITIVES:	acts of expounding of views, conducting of arguments, and clarifying, e.g., deny, inform, concede, refer, etc.

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Speech Act Classification by John Austin

❑ One can find many faults with these five classes of utterances that mostly have to do with the overlapping of concepts and intermingling of classes.

❑ This begs the question of whether an expositive with a commissive, 'I vow that…', is an expositive commissive or just a commissive; or whether a declaration of war, if uttered

❑ 'We hereby declare war on …', is a commissive, exercitive, or an expositive of either or both!

Speech Act Theory

O J. Searle is concerned with the act of promising and lists several factors which he believes constitute the act of promising:

1. intending to do the thing promised

2. intending that the uttering of the words of promising place one under an obligation

3. intending that the promisee learn that the uttered words place the promisor under an obligation,

4. intending that the promisee recognize this last intention by understanding the meaning of the words of promising.

Speech Act Theory

❑ From Searle's view, there are

   only five illocutionary points that speakers can achieve on propositions in an utterance, namely:

1. the assertive,

2. the commissive,

3. the directive,

4. the declaratory and

5. the expressive illocutionary points.

Speech Act Classes

❑ Speakers achieve the *assertive point* when they represent how things are in the world,

❑ the *commissive point* when they commit themselves to doing something,

❑ the *directive point* when they make an attempt to get hearers to do something,

❑ the *declaratory point* when they do things in the world at the moment of the utterance solely by virtue of saying that they do and

❑ the *expressive point* when they express their attitudes about objects and facts of the world (Vanderkeven and Kubo 2002).

Speech Act Classes

❑ Assertives (statements, averrings) have a word-to-world direction of fit;

❑ Directives (commands, requests, entreaties), have a world-to-word direction of fit,

❑ as also do Commisives (promises), which bind the speaker to perform a certain action in the future.

❑ Expressives (congratulations, apologies, condolences) have no direction of fit; they simply presuppose the truth of the expressed proposition.

❑ Declaratives (appointings, baptizings, marryings), in contrast, bring about the fit between word and world by the very fact of their successful performance.

Classify these speech acts according to Searle's classification

- (a) You're hired!
- (b) John Searle classified speech acts.
- (c) Well done!
- (d) Can you get the door?
- (e) Wait until your father gets home!

Note that the classification depends on <u>function</u> rather than <u>form</u>.

Possible answers:

☐ (a) You're hired!
   (Declaration)
☐ (b) John Searle classified speech acts.
   (Representative)
☐ (c) Well done!
   (Expressive)
☐ (d) Can you get the door?
   (Directive)
☐ (e) Wait until your father gets home!
   (Commissive)

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Indirect speech acts

❑ One common way of performing speech acts is to use an expression which indicates one speech act, and indeed performs this act, but also performs a further speech act, which is indirect.

Indirect speech acts

❑ J.Searle can also be merited for introducing a theory of **indirect speech acts**. Indirect speech acts are cases in which one speech act is performed *indirectly, by way of performing another:*

❑ *Can you pass me the salt?* Though the sentence is interrogative, it is conventionally used to mark a request – we cannot just answer "yes" or "no". According to modern point of view such utterances contain **two illocutionary forces**, with one of them dominating.

Indirect speech acts

❑ Indirect speech acts are commonly used to reject proposals and to make requests. For example, if a speaker asks, "Would you like to meet me for coffee?" and the other replies, "I have class."

❑ The second speaker has used an indirect speech act to reject the proposal. This is indirect because the literal meaning of "I have class" does not entail any sort of rejection.

Indirect speech acts

❑ This poses a problem for linguists, as it is confusing (on a rather simple approach) to see how the person who made the proposal can understand that his proposal was rejected. Searle suggests that the illocutionary force of indirect speech acts can be derived by means of a Gricean reasoning process; however, the process he proposes does not seem to accurately solve the problem.

Indirect speech acts

❑ In other words, this means that one does not need to say the words apologize, pledge, or praise in order to show they are doing the action.

❑ The examples above show how the actions and indirect words make something happen rather than coming out straightforward with specific words and saying it.

Speech Act Theory and on

The locutionary and perlocutionary force of utterances are always interpreted and achieved in a particular context.

As far as dialogue management is concerned, that results in a need to define speech acts for different genres and take into account the characteristics of a dialogue and the specific dialogue context in which they appear.

For example, different speech acts are used in a human-human than a human-computer interaction;

Speech Act Theory and on

Dore (1975) proposed that children's utterances were realizations of one of *nine primitive speech acts*:

1. labelling
2. repeating
3. answering
4. requesting (action)
5. requesting (answer)
6. calling
7. greeting
8. protesting
9. practicing

Herbert Paul Grice (1913-1988)

Herbert Paul Grice (1913-1988) is British philosopher, famous for his innovative work in philosophy of language;
• His **Theory of Implicature** is important contribution to pragmatics;
• **Conversational Implicature:** meaning beyond the literal sense which must be inferred from non-linguistic features of a conversational situation together with general principle of communication and cooperation.

Herbert Paul Grice (1913-1988)

A conversational implicature of an assertion is something that is conveyed to a thoughtful listener *by the mode of expression* rather than by the meanings of the words.

These arise from the fact that conversation is normally governed by principles including cooperation, truthfulness, and informativeness, and that both parties are aware of these.

Herbert Paul Grice (1913-1988)

Grice published his Cooperative principle of communication in "Logic and Conversation", 1975; Cooperative principle is a norm governing all cooperative interactions among humans: "Make your conversational contribution what is required, at the stage at which it occurs, by the accepted purpose or direction of the talk exchange in which you are engaged"

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Herbert Paul Grice (1913-1988)

The Cooperative Principle

Gricean maxims

Quality: Be truthful. Do not say what you believe is false. Do not say that for which you lack adequate evidence.

Quantity: Be informative. Make your contribution as informative as required. Do not make your contribution more informative than required.

Relation: Be relevant. Make your contribution relevant.

Manner: Be perspicuous [pəˈspɪkjuəs].
Avoid ambiguity, obscurity. Be brief, orderly

Gricean maxims

The maxims operate as a type of baseline for a conversation, allowing hearers to make inferences based on speaker intention and _implied meaning_. This is called _conversational implicature_. This does not mean, however, that the conversational maxims are adhered to all of the time. On the contrary, there are many occasions on which they are not, but when this happens, hearers (or readers) consider whether the non-adherence is signicant in itself – in other words, whether we can _make certain inferences_ when they are not adhered to.

Gricean maxims

Quality:	Quantity:	Relation:	Manner:
Be truthful.	Be informative.	Be relevant.	Be perspicuous.
Do not say what you believe is false.	Make your contribution as informative as required.	Make your contribution relevant.	Avoid ambiguity, obscurity.
Do not say that for which you lack adequate evidence.	Do not make your contribution more informative than required.		Be brief, orderly

Conversational maxim?
Obeyed, violated or flouted:

- Violating maxims (Grice's term): speaker secretly breaks them (e.g., intentionally lying)
- Flouting (flaʊt): overtly breaking the maxims for some linguistic effect (e.g., sarcasm, irony, entertainment…)

To flout is to show disdain, scorn, or contempt; scoff or mock.

Distinguishing factor:

we must look at a speaker's intention!

Conversational maxim? Obeyed, violated or flouted:

Obeyed, violated or flouted?

- Where did you get those shoes?

Implicature:

I think they're pretty lame!

Obeyed, violated or flouted?

- I'm trying to watch the game!

Implicature:

Please shut up!

Geoffrey Leech

According to Geoffrey Leech, there is a politeness principle with conversational maxims similar to those formulated by Paul Grice.

Leech lists six maxims: tact, generosity, approbation, modesty, agreement, and sympathy.

The first and second form a pair, as do the third and the fourth.

These maxims may vary from culture to culture: what may be considered polite in one culture may be strange or downright rude in another.

Edward Hall:
Concept of High- and Low- context cultures

High-Context CULTURE	Low-Context CULTURE
❑ Covert messages	❑ Overt Messages
❑ Internalized Messages	❑ Plainly Coded Messages
❑ Extensive non-verbal codes	❑ Details verbalized
❑ Reaction Reserved	❑ Reaction on surface
❑ Distinct In and Out Groups	❑ Flexible In and Out Groups
❑ Strong interpersonal bonds	❑ Weak interpersonal bonds
❑ High commitment	❑ Low commitment
❑ Open time	❑ Closed time

High Vs. Low Context Cultures

High Context

- long lasting relationships
- implicit communication
- loyalty to people of authority
- spoken agreements
- outsiders do not gain entry easily
  -
    www.theodora.com/flags

Low Context

- relationships are short in duration
- explicit communication
- authority is diffused
- written agreements
- ousiders are encouraged to join inner circle
  - U.S.

[FIGURE 3] HIGH-CONTEXT VS. LOW-CONTEXT COMMUNICATION

In China: high context

In the West: low context

▪ Less explicit communication	▪ People play by external rules
▪ More internalized understanding of what is communicated	▪ More knowledge is codified, public, external, and accessible
▪ Multiple intersections with others	▪ Separation—of time, of space, of activities, of relationships
▪ Long-term relationships	▪ More interpersonal connections of shorter duration
▪ Strong boundaries	
▪ Knowledge is situational, relational	▪ Knowledge is more often transferable
▪ Decisions and activities focus around personal, face-to-face relationships	▪ Task-centered

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Geoffrey Leech

Leech's **Tact Maxim**
The tact maxim is minimizing cost to other and maximizing benefit to other. This maxim is applied in Searle's speech act, **commissives** and **directives** called by Leech as impositives.

Geoffrey Leech

Commissives are found in utterances that express speaker's intention in the future action.

Then, **Directives/ Impositives** are expressions that influence the hearer to do action.

The example of **the tact maxim** is as follows:

"Won't you sit down?"

It is the *directive/ impositive utterance*. This utterance is spoken to ask the hearer sitting down. The speaker uses indirect utterance to be more polite and minimizing cost to the hearer. This utterance implies that sitting down is benefit to the hearer.

INDIRECT SPEECH ACTS

A frequent situation in language use is where the literal meaning of a sentence is not that which the speaker wishes the hearer to use in his/her interpretation. A simple example illustrates this. The sentence *'It's very draughty ['drɑːftɪ] in here'* is not normally intended as a simple statement but as an indirect request to close a window or door in a room. For reasons of politeness speakers may choose this indirect method of realising a *directive speech act*. Such acts leave the addressee the option of not complying with the implied request *without losing face*.

Geoffrey Leech

Leech's **generosity maxim states**:

"Minimize the expression of beliefs that express or imply benefit to self; maximize the expression of beliefs that express or imply cost to self."

Unlike the **tact maxim**, the maxim of generosity focuses on the speaker, and says that others should be put first instead of the self.

For example:

You relax and let me do the dishes.

You must come and have dinner with us.

Geoffrey Leech

Leech's **approbation maxim** states:
"Minimize the expression of beliefs which express dispraise of other; maximize the expression of beliefs which express approval of other."
It is preferred to praise others and if this is impossible, to sidestep the issue, to give some sort of minimal response (possibly through the use of euphemisms), or to remain silent.

A: "The performance was great!"
B: "Yes, wasn't it!"

Geoffrey Leech

Leech's **approbation maxim** :
The first part of the maxim avoids disagreement;
the second part intends to make other people feel
good by showing solidarity.
For example:

I heard you singing at the karaoke last night.
It sounded like you were enjoying yourself!
Gideon, I know you're a genius – would you know
how to solve this math problem here?

Geoffrey Leech

The **modesty maxim:**

The maxim of modesty is one of the six maxims proposed by Leech (1983) in his PP (politeness principle) meaning to minimize praise or to maximize dispraise of self.

The modesty maxim states:

"Minimize the expression of praise of self; maximize the expression of dispraise of self."

For example:

Oh, I'm so stupid – I didn't make a note of our lecture! Did you?

Geoffrey Leech

The agreement maxim runs as follows:
"Minimize the expression of disagreement between self and other; maximize the expression of agreement between self and other."
It is in line with Brown and <u>Levinson</u>'s positive politeness strategies of "seek agreement" and "avoid disagreement", to which they attach great importance. However, it is not being claimed that people totally avoid disagreement. It is simply observed that they are much more direct in expressing agreement, rather than disagreement.

Geoffrey Leech

However, it is not being claimed that people totally avoid disagreement. It is simply observed that they are much more direct in expressing agreement, rather than disagreement.
For example:
A: I don't want my daughter to do this, I want her to do that.
B: Yes, but ma'am, I thought we resolved this already on your last visit.

Geoffrey Leech

The sympathy maxim states:
"minimize antipathy between self and other; maximize sympathy between the self and other."
This includes a small group of speech acts such as congratulation, commiseration, and expressing condolences – all of which is in accordance with Brown and Levinson's positive politeness strategy of attending to the hearer's interests, wants, and needs.
For example:
I am sorry to hear about your father.

Leech's Politeness Maxims again

Politeness Theory on Youtube

Politeness Theory

Politeness theory, of which proposers are Penelope Brown and Stephen C. Levinson, accounts for politeness which centers redressing the affronts to people's self-esteems of effectively claiming positive social values in social interactions.
Such self-esteem is referred as the sociological concept of face (as in "save face" or "lose face") to discuss politeness as a response to mitigate or avoid face-threatening acts such as requests or insults.

Politeness Theory

In general politeness is an aspect of a speaker's social behaviour which shows deference ['def(ə)r(ə)n(t)s] towards the wishes and concerns of the addressee. There is a linguistic manifestation of politeness, investigated seminally in a book by the English linguists Penelope Brown and Stephen C. Levinson (1979), which involves strategies for maximising deference in exchanges, e.g. by employing indirect speech acts or by using formal address terms.

Politeness Theory

Notable components in the framework of the theory include (1) positive and (2) negative faces, (3) face threatening act (FTA), (3a) strategies for doing FTAs and (4) factors influencing the choices of strategies; These strategies aim at a certain goal, to save the face of the addressee.

Politeness Theory

The term face refers to the *public self-image* of speakers and can be subdivided into two main types. Positive face refers to an individual's wish to be respected and appreciated by others. Negative face refers to the wish not to be restricted or impeded in the choices one makes concerning social behaviour. **Politeness** is hence understood as a means of showing awareness of another's face.

Politeness Theory

Notable components in the framework of the theory include positive and negative faces, face threatening act (FTA), strategies for doing FTAs and factors influencing the choices of strategies; each described below.

 Social behaviour can constitute face saving acts by being deferential to others, emphasizing the importance of their wishes and concerns.

Politeness Theory

On the contrary a <u>face threatening act</u> tends to encroach on another's freedom of action and may be interpreted as an imposition or indeed an insult. There are many linguistic strategies for minimising the threat to negative face, for instance by apologizing in advance for disturbing someone, and for maximising the enhancement of positive face, for instance by pointing out a common interest in some suggestion made to an addressee

Politeness Theory

Among the studies of politeness in a variety of cultures for many years, Penelope Brown and Stephen Levinson's politeness theory has become very influential. Though Brown and Levinson proposed their model as universally applicable, their theory has been challenged by other scholars in varied aspects such as its cross-cultural applicability or ways to interpret and conceptualize politeness.

Politeness Theory hedges

Hedges

An expression of uncertainty on behalf of the speaker which reduces the overall force of an utterance, such as use of the phrase 'sort of'. Often used in investigations of linguistic politeness.

Politeness Theory hedges

Languages provide devices or strategies for reducing the potential loss of face in social interactions. For instance, hedges are devices, used in conversation, which serve the purpose of weakening the force of a statement,
e.g. He is perhaps the culprit after all.
Could you possibly give me a hand?
He's not up to scratch, I suppose.
She won't leave us, will she?

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presupposition

[ˌpriːsʌpəˈzɪʃ(ə)n]

is something that you assume to be true, especially something which you must assume is true in order to continue with what you are saying or thinking.

presupposition

[ˌpriːsʌpəˈzɪʃ(ə)n]

In the branch of linguistics known as pragmatics, a presupposition (or PSP) is an implicit assumption about the world or background belief relating to an utterance whose truth is taken for granted in discourse.

presupposition

[ˌpriːsʌpəˈzɪʃ(ə)n]

Presupposition is also called a *conventional implicature* by Grice).

presupposition

Presupposition is defined as:

What is presupposed and what falls outside the scope of the sentential negation.

Diana [daɪˈænə] is not **Queen of** the United Kingdom and the other Commonwealth realms and had never been.

Presupposition: There could be a Queen thereof.

presupposition

Presupposition is defined as:

What is presupposed is the pieces of information that the speaker by lexical and syntactic choices signals to the audience that they must take as given (and incorporate in their mental model if it isn't already there) in order to understand what is said as part of existing mental model of the situation talked about.

Presupposition

Communication normally takes place against a background of beliefs or assumptions which are shared by the speaker and his audience, and which are recognized by them to be so shared.

Presupposition

. • The more common ground we can take for granted, the more efficient our communication will be.

• I will not say things that are already taken for granted, since that would be redundant. Nor will I assert things incompatible with the common background, since that would be self-defeating.

• When we make an assertion we add an increment of information to the common ground.

Presupposition versus Implicature

Frank says to Edgar::

Bill found it depressing that after he stopped using steroids, the coach didn't want him on the team.

What have we learned about the situation?

Implicature and Presupposition: Review

- ✓ There was a team which had a coach.

- ✓ There was a coach who at some point wanted Bill to be on a team. Bill used to use steroids.

- ✓ In the past, Bill played on a team.

- ✓ Bill used steroids to improve his game.

- ✓ Bill doesn't play on a team now.

- ✓ After Bill stopped using steroids, the coach no longer wanted him on the team.

So, What is what?

What is Implicature and what is Presupposition here?

The studies of **Pragmatics** are divided into two big schools British & American School and European School which can be subdivided into France School, Prague School and Copenhagen School.

British & American School is traditionally centering on studying the sentence structure and grammar, and their studies of pragmatics is also restricted to several definite topics such as deictic expressions, conversational implicature, presupposition, speech and conversation structure.

European School has a wide understanding, and their studies even include conversation analysis, cultural anthropology, social linguistics and psycholinguistics during intercommunication.

Divisions of Pragmatics

There are three divisions of Pragmatics:

1. Micro-pragmatics

2. Macro-pragmatics

3. Meta-pragmatics

Types of Pragmatics

1. Micro-pragmatics
The studies of Micro-pragmatics are, on the level of language using, centering upon the discussion of pragmatic tasks aroused by the understanding of language symbols' reference and implicature during conversation, including Context, Conversational implicature, Reference, Pragmatic Principles, speech Acts and Conversation Analysis.

Divisions of Pragmatics

2. Macro-pragmatics

The studies of Macro-pragmatics are, on the level of society & culture, focus on the problems of how to use language for language user during the process of communication, including Pragmatic Acts, Literary Pragmatics, Pragmatics Across Cultures and the Social Aspects of Pragmatics. .

Divisions of Pragmatics

3. **Metapragmatics**

Metapragmatics which can be considered as a review, a survey or a reflection of pragmatics itself, including making statements about itself, questioning itself, improving itself, quoting itself and rethinking the methodologies and theoretic system during the process of its studies

Pragmatics versus Semantics

The field of pragmatics deals with the principles of language use that explain how **extra meaning** is conveyed without being encoded in language.(Mm..???)
Therefore, we need to investigate **the speaker meaning**, i.e. how meaning is communicated by the speaker (or writer) and interpreted by a listener (or reader).
Thus, pragmatics concentrates more on the analysis of what people mean by their utterances than what the words or phrases in those utterances might **mean by themselves (which is analysed in semantics)**.

Pragmatics versus Syntax

❑ Syntax addresses the formal relations of signs to one another, semantics deals with the relation of signs to what they denote, and pragmatics has a big deal with the relation of signs to their users and interpreters

❑ The central rationale [ˌræʃəˈnɑːl]for pragmatics sentence meaning (semantics) in natural languages vastly underdetermines speaker's meaning (intentions).

❑ The goal of pragmatics is to explain how the gap between sentence meaning and speaker's meaning is bridged.

Colorless green ideas sleep furiously

The sentence

"Colorless green ideas sleep furiously"

was presented by Chomsky as a great example of a series of words strung together randomly. It grammatical according to the lexical classification, however, it is non-sense on a semantic level. Or so goes the claim. But is the claim correct?

Pragmatics versus Grammar

In fact, after we have analyzed a sentence grammatically, our job is done;
in a pragmatic inquiry, we deal with an ever-unfolding process-as the discourse goes on and on, the extra meaning of some words become clearer and clearer.

| Text	
Discourse analysis	Text Linguistics
Meaning Semantics	Situation and Context (Pragmatics)
Grammar (Morphology and Syntax)	Sentences, phrases, clauses, words
Phonology & Phonetics	Sounds and Letters

Please, don't forget to pay a visit to your test page

Politeness principle:

Tact

Generosity

Modesty

Sympathy

Approbation

Agreement

Geoffrey Leech

Politeness principle:

1 The tact maxim;
2 The generosity maxim;
3 The approbation maxim;
4 The modesty maxim;
5 The agreement maxim;
6 The sympathy maxim.

Geoffrey Leech

Politeness principle:

1. The tact maxim	"Minimize cost to other and maximize benefit to other."
2. The generosity maxim	"Minimize the expression of **beliefs** that express or imply benefit to self; maximize the expression of **beliefs** that express or imply cost to self."
3. The approbation maxim	"Minimize the expression of **beliefs** which express dispraise of other; maximize the expression of **beliefs** which express approval of other."
4. The modesty maxim	"Minimize the expression of praise of self; maximize the expression of dispraise of self."
5. The agreement maxim	""Minimize the expression of disagreement between self and other; maximize the expression of agreement between self and other." "Try to be more direct in expressing agreement, rather than disagreement. "
6. The sympathy maxim	"Minimize antipathy between self and other; maximize sympathy between the self and other."

Geoffrey Leech

Politeness Principle Answers:

1 The tact maxim	Give your own examples
2 The generosity maxim	Give your own examples
3 The approbation maxim	A: "The performance was great!" B: "Yes, wasn't it!"
4 The modesty maxim	*Oh, I'm so stupid – I didn't make a note of our lecture! Did you*?
5 The agreement maxim	avoids disagreement; the second part intends to make other people feel good by showing solidarity. Give your own examples
6 The sympathy maxim	*I am sorry to hear about your father.*

Vocabulary	Words and phrases can be analyzed for ideological associations, formality, and euphemistic and metaphorical content.
Grammar	The way that sentences are constructed (e.g. verb tenses, active or passive construction, and the use of imperatives and questions) can reveal aspects of intended meaning.
Structure	The structure of a text can be analyzed for how it creates emphasis or builds a narrative.
Genre	Texts can be analyzed in relation to the conventions and communicative aims of their genre (e.g. political speeches or tabloid newspaper articles).
Non-verbal communication	Non-verbal aspects of speech, such as tone of voice, pauses, gestures, and sounds like "um", can reveal aspects of a speaker's intentions, attitudes, and emotions.
Conversational codes	The interaction between people in a conversation, such as turn-taking, interruptions and listener response, can reveal aspects of cultural conventions and social roles.

Entailment versus Inference

Entailment: A type of sense relations Definition:
IF when Proposition A is true, Proposition B must therefore be true, THEN Proposition A ENTAILS Proposition B 4
Example Proposition A: 'John is a bachelor.' Proposition B: 'John is not married.' IF A is true, B must be true. 'John is a bachelor' ENTAILS 'John is not married.'
Inference: Any conclusion that one can reasonably draw from sentences or utterances.
All entailments are inferences, but NOT all inferences are entailment!

Explicit Performatives and Primary Utterances

Due to the fact that the distinction between performatives and constatives is questionable in several ways, Austin further distinguishes between explicit performatives and primary utterances.

Explicit Performatives and Primary Utterances

1) "primary utterance: 'I shall be there.'
2) explicit performative: 'I promise that I shall be there.'" (Austin 1976:69). The first example does not make use of a performative verb, whereas the second does. Still, both examples have similar implications, i.e. they both are promises, but only in the second example the promise is made explicit. At this point, Austin recognizes that an utterance can also be performative without including a performative verb. For example, "I salute you" is an act of greeting just as "Salaam."

Criteria for Speech Act Classifications

1. <u>According to their origin</u>:

a) **primary (or natural)** speech acts are necessary for any kind of human interaction.

b) **secondary (or institutional)** speech acts are specific for a certain institution, for example, for school instruction, courtroom investigation, political debate, commercial advertising, etc.

Institutions can bring into life new types of speech acts, for example, the giving of a verdict, the opening of a meeting, etc. On the other hand, institutions can modify primary speech acts. Thus, an examination question is different from a question in everyday communication.

Criteria for Speech Act Classifications

2. According to their function:

a) **initiating speech acts** - questions or requests
b) **reacting speech acts** - confirmations or answers

The differentiation of **initiating** and **reacting speech acts** is not an easy task because most speech acts perform both functions in the process of communication.

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Exercise: Performance Sentences?

a) I testify that she met the agent.
b) I know that she met the agent.
c) I suppose the Yankees will win.
d) I bet her $2500 that Clinton would lose the election.
e) I teach the class.
f) We promise to leave early.
g) We owe Revenue Canada 1, 000, 000.
h) I bequeath $ 100, 000 to ABU.
i) I swore I didn't do it.
j) I swear I didn't do it.
k) I hereby sentence you for life after all the charges against you have been proven true...

Conclusion

- ✓ Communication is not just a matter of words.
- ✓ Communication is a matter of action.
- ✓ Communication is a matter of relationships and power.
- ✓ Communication creates and re-creates our social worlds.

About Discourse
Creative Presentation template

Zellig Sabbatai Harris
(1909–1992)
"Discourse Analysis" papers in 1952
Born in Odessa region; migrated 1911

Chomsky, Noam Avram
Born 1928
In Philadelphia;
His Father left Odessa in 1913;
Syntactic Structures, 1951-55; 1957 (62RU)

Émile Benveniste
(French: [bẽvenist];
(1902 –1976)
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Robert-Alain de Beaugrande
(1946 –2008)
De Beaugrande, Robert & Dressler, Wolfgang
Introduction to Text Linguistics.
London ; New York : Longman, 1981
xv, 270 p.

Robert-Alain de Beaugrande
Universidade Federal da Paraíba
**Wolfgang Dressler**
Universität Wien

Teun Adrianus van Dijk
(born 1943-)
Text Linguistics, Discourse Analysis, Critical Discourse Analysis

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
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JOHN R. SEARLE

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