Тема 4. Language use in context

Weeks 19–21

Language use in context: pragmatics,

Speech Act Theory,

Grice's Maxims,

politeness theory;

'Introduction to English Language aims to give students a broad overview of some of the main areas of study involved in the discipline of linguistics: the study of language, i.e. ...

"- a solid basis in language analysis from which to proceed".

Satori Soden, EN1023, 2012, p.1

DISCOURSE

PRAGMATICS

SEMANTICS

SYNTAX

MORPHOLOGY

PHONOLOGY

PHONETICS

speech sounds

phonemes

words

phrases and sentences

literal meaning of phrases and sentences

meaning in context of discourse

text

Pragmatics is

❑ "The study of the relation of signs to their interpreters. " (Charles Morris)

❑ "The study of contextual meaning communicated by a speaker or writer, and interpreted by a listener or reader. " (G. Yule)

❑ • "The study of the relations between linguistic forms and its users(...) Only pragmatics allows humans into the analysis: their assumptions, purposes, goals, and actions they perform while speaking. " (G. Yule)

Pragmatics

- Austin – How to do things with words
- Grice – The Cooperative Principle + implicature
- Goffman – Face
- Brown and Levinson – Politeness
- Wierzbicka – Culture and Cognition

J. L. Austin How to do things with words.

- Locutionary Acts
  - Saying something about something
- Illucutionary acts
  - Doing something by saying something
  - Performatives.
- Perlocutionary Acts

Performatives

1. The uttering of the words is .. the performance of which is also the object of the utterance.
2. Circumstances around the performative must be appropriate
    1. good faith v. bad faith
    2. Other things have to go right (happy) (felicities)
    3. Must be an <u>accepted conventional procedure</u>
    4. Particular persons must be appropriate for the invocation of the act
    5. Procedure must be executed <u>correctly and completely</u>
    6. Person must have those thoughts and feelings requisite of the act
    7. Must actually <u>conduct themselves subsequently.</u>
3. Sinning against rules will make the performance **unhappy**
4. **Explicit** (I bet, I promise, ...) versus **Implicit** performatives (where the performative is only a possibility (might, perhaps, (you might be wrong)
5. **Entails** (all men blush) versus **Implies** versus **Presupposes** (all Jacks children are bald presupposes that Jack has children.

Examples of Austin's Performatives

1. Verdictives: Delivering a verdict,

   judgement official or unofficial, acquit, convict, find (as a matter of fact), hold, interpret as, understand, read it as, rule, calculate, reckon, estimate, locate, place, date, measure, put it at, make it, take it, grade, rank, rate, assess, value, describe, characterize, diagnose, analyze.

2. Exercitives: Giving a decision in favor or against a certain course of action from a position of power.

   appoint, degrade, demote, dismiss, excommunicate, name, order, command, direct, sentence, fine, grant, levy, vote for, nominate, choose, claim, give, bequeath, pardon, resign, warn, advise, plead, pray, entreat, beg, urge, press, recommend, proclaim, announce, quash, counterman, annul, repeal;, enact, reprieve, veto, dedicate, declare closed, declare open

3. Comissives: Commits the speaker to a course of action; implies obligation

   promise, covenant, contract, undertake, bind myself, give my word, …

4. Behabitives: Adopting an attitude in reaction to the behavior of others

   1) apologize, 2) thank, 3) sympathy 4) attitudes 5) greetings, 6) wishes, 7) challenges (dare, defy,   protest, challenge).

5. Expositives: Expounding one's views, clarifying

- 1. affirm, deny, state, describe, class, identify; 2. remark, mention,

Examples of Austin's Performatives

Verdictives	I state my judgement
Exercitives:	I exercise my power
Comissives:	I take on an obligation
Behabitives	I express my reaction to other's doing
Expositives:	I am expounding my views, clarifying

Points to remember

- Austin demonstrated that while some words were used to describe things (a locutionary act), other words (and sentences) did things.

- The variety of words on the previous slide point this out clearly.

- Austin's work introduced a new field of language study now known as pragmatics.

- Bourdieu pointed out that conditions of the performative are all associated with the social institution.

Institutions (Bourdieu) and Speech Acts

1. **Roles:**
   1. Particular persons must be appropriate for the invocation of the act

2. **Practices:**
   1. Must be an accepted conventional procedure
   2. Must be executed correctly and completely

3. **Other Considerations**
   1. Sincerity: Person must have those thoughts and feelings requisite of the act
   2. Consistency: Must actually conduct themselves subsequently.

The history of pragmatics can be described as a conjunction of different moves,
coming from epistemology and semiotics (Morris 1938),
philosophy of language:
(Austin 1962; Searle 1969),
logic:
(Frege [1892]1952; Russell 1905),
and linguistics:
(Horn 1972; Wilson 1975; Kempson 1975; Gazdar 1979).

The history of pragmatics

Basic pragmatics was initially linked to reference and
presupposition (Frege and Russell),
semantic and pragmatic presuppositions
(Wilson and Kempson; Stalnaker 1977),
and illocutionary acts (Austin and Searle),
and it was only in the mid-70s that the main pragmatics topic,
implicatures, was introduced in Grice's seminal and
programmatic article Logic and Conversation.

The history of pragmatics

The first issue of a journal devoted to pragmatics was the third issue of Peter Cole's and Jerry Morgan's Syntax and Semantics (1975), which is renowned for the fact that certain of Grice's fundamental articles, as well as John Searle's Indirect Speech Acts, were published there. Three and six years later, Peter Cole edited two collections and the eighth issue of Syntax and Semantics (Pragmatics) and Radical Pragmatics. Both publications contained articles by Grice, respectively Further Note on Logic and Conversation and Presupposition and Conversational Implicature.

The history of pragmatics

These three books explicitly show how the domain of pragmatics changed very quickly, moving from classic philosophical issues such as speech acts to more linguistic concerns including presupposition, information structure, discourse, and irony. It is a striking fact that in less than ten years the concept of implicatures has become the core concept of the new pragmatic perspective on meaning.

H. P. Grice (1913-88)
Cooperative Principle

Make your contribution such as is required, at the stage at which it occurs, by the accepted purpose or direction of the talk exchange in which you are engaged.

Grice (1975, 45)

MEANING

In linguistics, and particularly in structural linguistics, meaning results from a set of conventions that define a specific natural language. According to Saussure, for instance, "Le signe linguistique unit non une chose et un nom, mais un concept et une image acoustique" (Saussure 1968: 98).

1 It is a well-known fact that the relationship between the signifiant (acoustic image) and the signifié (concept) is arbitrary and unmotivated.

This is similar to the classic Chomskyan view of language, which defines grammar as a system in which strings of sounds and strings of meanings interface.

MEANING

In other words, the linguistic belief system states that meaning is one part of the linguistic sign (Saussure) as well as one aspect of grammar, computed at the intentional-conceptual interface (Hauser, Chomsky, and Fitch 2002)

https://www.researchgate.net/publication/260319066_Conversational_and_conventional_implicatures [accessed May 24 2021].

MEANING

In *Logic and Conversation (1975)*, Grice makes a very general distinction between what is said by a speaker and what he means or implicates. Let us begin with one of his famous examples:

MEANING

"Suppose that A and B are talking about a mutual friend, C, who is now working in a bank. A asks B how C is getting on in his job, and B replies, Oh quite well, I think; he likes his colleagues, and he hasn't been in prison yet." (Grice 1975: 43). Now what is interesting is Grice's comment: "I think it is clear that whatever B implied, suggested, meant, etc., in this example, is distinct from what B said, which was simply that C had not been in prison yet" (Grice 1975: 43)

MEANING

In his words, "In the sense in which I am using the word say, I intend what someone has said to be closely related to the conventional meaning of the word (the sentence) he has uttered" (Grice 1975: 44).

MEANING

As what is said must be understood in terms of what philosophers define as meaning, that is, sense and reference, what is said is the result of a linguistic computation implying the description of a full proposition with a truth value.

https://www.researchgate.net/publication/260319066_Conversational_and_conventional_implicatures [accessed May 24 2021].

MEANING

"Mentioning, or referring to, something is a characteristic of a use of an expression, as 'being about' something, and truth-or-falsity, are characteristics of a use of a sentence" (Strawson 1971: 180)

MEANING

This implies that Grice's idea of what is said cannot be restricted to a merely linguistic notion of logical form: it is a full proposition with a truth value, as implied in the work of Austin and Strawson. It was also used by Searle in his seminal article on literal meaning (Searle 1979: 117), when he stated that "... the notion of literal meaning of a sentence only has application relative to a set of contextual or background assumptions (...)".

MEANING

one part of non-natural meaning is what is said, which can be reduced to the truth-conditional aspect of meaning, while the other part is the non-truth-conditional aspect of meaning, known as implicature

https://www.researchgate.net/publication/266319066_Conversational_and_conventional_implicatures [accessed May 24 2021].

MEANING

Manage: Masha managed to start the car.

Entailment: Masha started the car.

Conventional implicature: It required some effort to start the car. Masha made some effort to start the car.

Fail: Bush failed to read the report. (Karttunen and Zaenen 2005)

Entailment: Bush did not read the report.

Conventional implicature: Bush had an opportunity and tried, or should have tried, to read it.

Still: Alfred has still not come. (from Frege 1918),

Entailment: Alfred has not come.

Conventional implicature: Alfred was expected to have come by now.

MEANING

Too:

Manfred Krifka was in Moscow last spring too.

Entails: Manfred Krifka was in Moscow last spring.

Conventionally implicates:

Some other given person was in Moscow last spring

MEANING

one part of non-natural meaning is what is said, which can be reduced to the truth-conditional aspect of meaning, while the other part is the non-truth-conditional aspect of meaning, known as implicature

https://www.researchgate.net/publication/260319066_Conversational_and_conventional_implicatures [accessed May 24 2021].

MEANING

Even Bill likes Mary

The word even does not have anything with truth and reference…

MEANING

Even Bill likes Mary

The word even does not have anything with truth and reference...

Bill likes Mary

Bill is the least likely to like Mary.

Bill is the last person likely to like Mary.

https://www.researchgate.net/publication/260319066_Conversational_and_conventional_implicatures [accessed May 24 2021].

MEANING

Even Bill likes Mary

The test for a conventional implicature is the '*but' test, which leads to a contradiction when but introduce the negation of one of the conventional implicatures

*Even Bill likes Mary, but no one else does. (??)

https://www.researchgate.net/publication/260319066_Conversational_and_conventional_implicatures [accessed May 24 2021].

TYPES OF SPOKEN MEANING

TYPES OF SPOKEN MEANING

The concept "presupposition" was raised by the eminent German logician Frege in 1892. Presupposition refers to the implicit information of proposition embedded in a sentence or utterance.

TYPES OF SPOKEN MEANING

Truth-conditional semantics is an approach which studies the propositional meaning of sentences and the logical conditions for establishing their truth or falsity, (Finch, 2000: 184).

TYPES OF SPOKEN MEANING

Truth-conditional semantics is an approach which studies the propositional meaning of sentences and the logical conditions for establishing their truth or falsity, (Finch, 2000: 184).

'John's brother has just come back from Nigeria.' (p)·

⮕ 'John has a brother.' (q)

Presupposition survives under negation as in:·

'John's brother hasn't just come back from Nigeria'(p1) still presupposes:·

⮕ 'John has a brother.' (q)

TYPES OF SPOKEN MEANING

Truth-conditional semantics is an approach which studies the propositional meaning of sentences and the logical conditions for establishing their truth or falsity, (Finch, 2000: 184).

'John's brother has just come back from Nigeria.' (p)·

 'John has a brother.' (q)

Presupposition survives under negation as in:·

'John's brother hasn't just come back from Nigeria'(p1) still presupposes:·

 'John has a brother.' (q)

TYPES OF SPOKEN MEANING

Pragmatists, on the other hand, argue that in addition to literal meaning, the sentence or utterance conveys a host of indirect information that can be pragmatically inferred. Presuppositions are one part of that information. Stalnaker (1974) has introduced the term 'pragmatic presupposition' in an influential early article where he establishes the fact that in order to correctly interpret an utterance, with respect to its truth and falsity, a context is needed, e.g., (cited in Mey, 1993: 202)

TYPES OF SPOKEN MEANING

Jackendoff (1972) proposes the presupposition of a sentence to denote "the information in the sentence that is assumed by the speaker to be shared by him and the hearer". The following examples illustrate the notion:
a.   Betty remembered to take her medicine.
b.   Betty did not remember to take her medicine.
c.   Betty was supposed to take her medicine.

PRESUPPOSITION TRIGGERS

A presupposition trigger is a lexical item or linguistic construction which is responsible for the presupposition.

PRESUPPOSITION TRIGGERS

PRESUPPOSITION TRIGGERS

Existential presupposition:

a. Mary's dog is cute.

➡ b. There exists someone called Mary

➡ a. That Mary has a dog.

PRESUPPOSITION TRIGGERS

	LEXICAL PRESUPPOSITION TRIGGERS		PRESUPPOSITION
1	implicative verbs	a. John managed to open the door.	
2	Factive verbs or smth presupposing the truth)	b. She didn't realize he was ill. c. I regret to admit…	b.I wasn't aware that she was married.
3	Change of state verbs	a. Judy started smoking cigars. b. Judy started smoking cigars.	a.… didn't use to … b. … used to …
4	Verbs of judging	Accuse, criticize etc.	

PRESUPPOSITION TRIGGERS

	LEXICAL PRESUPPOSITION TRIGGERS		PRESUPPOSITION
5	Counter-factual verbs	a. Max is pretending that he is sick.	=>b. Max is not sick.
6	Conventional items	I cleaned the room	⇨ The room needed cleaning.
7	Iteratives	a. Bill drank another cup of tea. a. The flying saucer came/didn't come again. => b. Bill had drunk at least one. =>b. The flying saucer came before.	

PRESUPPOSITION TRIGGERS

	STRUCTURAL PRESUPPOSITION TRIGGERS		PRESUPPOSITION
1	Cleft constructions	What I need is love It is your hand I need.	
2	Wh-questions	When did he leave?	He left.
3	Adverbial clauses	a. She wrote the book when she lived in Boston	b. She lived in Boston
4	Comparative constructions	a. Carol is /isn't a better linguist than Barbara.	b. Barbara is a linguist
5	Counter factual conditionals	a. If you were my friend, you would have helped me.	b. You are not my friend
6	Non-restrictive clauses	The Proto-Harrappans, who flourished 2800-2650 B.C., were/were not great temple builders.	⇨ The Proto-Harrappans flourished 2800-2650 B.C.

Entailment versus inference

Entailment: A type of sense relations Definition:
IF when Proposition A is true, Proposition B must therefore be true, THEN Proposition A ENTAILS Proposition B

4-example Proposition A: 'John is a bachelor.'
Proposition B: 'John is not married.'
IF A is true, B must be true. 'John is a bachelor' ENTAILS 'John is not married.'
Inference: Any conclusion that one can reasonably draw from sentences or utterances.
All entailments are inferences, but NOT all inferences are entailment!

Gricean Cooperative Principle

- **The Cooperative Principle:**
  - Make your contribution such as is required, at the stage at which it occurs, by the accepted purpose or direction of the talk exchange in which you are engaged.

Gricean maxims

The Cooperative Principle includes the four Maxims of Conversation		
i	Quality	Try to make your contribution one that is true
ii	Quantity	Make your contribution as informative and no more so than is required.
iii	Relation	Be relevant
iv	Manner	Be perspicuous [pə'spɪkjuəs] – i.e. clearly expressed and easily understood; lucid.

Gricean maxims

The Cooperative Principle includes the four Maxims of Conversation		
i	Quality	Try to make your contribution one that is true. 1. Do not say what you believe to be false. 2. Do not say that for which you lack adequate evidence.
ii	Quantity	1. Make you contribution as informative as is required. 2. Do not make your contribution more information than is required.
iii	Relation	Be relevant!
iv	Manner	Be perspicuous [pə'spɪkjuəs] – i.e. clearly expressed and easily understood; lucid. Be perspicuous. 1. Avoid obscurity of expression. 2. Avoid ambiguity. 3. Be brief. 4. Be orderly.

Gricean maxims

The Maxims of Quality

i. Do not say what you believe to be false

ii. Do not say that for which you lack adequate evidence

Gricean maxims

The Maxims of Quantity

i. Make you contribution as informative as is required (for the current purposes of the exchange);

ii. Do not make your contribution more informative than is required;

Gricean maxims

The Maxims of Relation
Be relevant!

Gricean maxims

The Maxims of Manner
i. Avoid obscurity of expression
ii. Avoid ambiguity
iii. Be brief (avoid unnecessary prolixity)
iv. Be orderly

Gricean maxims

CHECK YOUSELF!

https://learningapps.org/display?v=p4pwyrt6a20

Gricean maxims

The speaker may exploit the maxims, that is,
(i)   violate the maxims,
(ii) opt out of both the maxims and the CP,
(iii) face a clash by fulfilling one maxim and
       violating another, and
(iv) flout a maxim.

Flout Gricean Maxims

CHECK YOUSELF!

https://learningapps.org/display?v=p
k8i8than21

Gricean maxims

The speaker may exploit the maxims, that is,
(i)   I have little money with me.
(ii) I cannot say more; my lips are sealed.
(iii) A: Where does Mary's mother live?
        B: Somewhere in the South of France.
(iv) War is war.

Gricean maxims

A: "I was bitten by something in Berlin Zoo."
B: "Was it an insect?" A: "Yes."
The inferences called implicatures are ever-present in language use, but, unlike entailments, they are not guarantees.
In saying 'I could have been wrong in my guess' – an implicature – that A did not know quite what had bitten her in the zoo, or over the further implicature that it was an insect that had bitten her.

Gricean maxims

The maxims operate as a type of baseline for a conversation, allowing hearers to make inferences based on speaker intention and _implied meaning_. This is called _conversational implicature_. This does not mean, however, that the conversational maxims are adhered to all of the time.
On the contrary, there are many occasions on which they are not, but when this happens, hearers (or readers) consider whether the non-adherence is signicant in itself – in other words, whether we can _make certain inferences_ when they are not adhered to.

Four things to do with CP

In a conversation, the speaker may do **one of four things** with regards to the cooperative principle and the maxims:

Four things to do with CP

i. The speaker may observe the maxims—this is the default assumption.
ii. The speaker may opt out of a maxim by using a phrase that eliminates or mitigates the effect of the maxims and signals this to the addressee—this phrase is called a hedge.
iii. The speaker may flout a maxim, to the full knowledge of the addressee
iv. The speaker may violate a maxim, e.g., lie.

Four things to do with CP

If the speaker chooses to do the last, (iv), he is ignoring the cooperative principle without giving the addressee a cue that he is doing so.

Grice's Confession

"I have stated my maxims as if this purpose were a maximally effective exchange of information"

https://www.ucl.ac.uk/ls/studypacks/Grice-Logic.pdf

Grice H. P. (1975), Logic and conversation, Syntax and semantics, Num. 3: Speech acts, Academic Press, New York

Grice's Confession

"There are characteristically, to some degree at least, cooperative efforts; and each participant recognizes in them, to some extent, a common purpose or set of purposes, or at least a mutually accepted direction."

https://www.sfu.ca/~jeffpell/Cogs300/GriceLogicConvers75.pdf

Grice's Confession

"I wish to represent a certain subclass of nonconventional implicatures, which I shall call CONVERSATIONAL implicatures, as being essentially connected with certain general features of discourse"

https://www.sfu.ca/~jeffpell/Cogs300/GriceLogicConvers75.pdf

Grice's Confession

"There are, of course, all sorts of other maxims (aesthetic, social, or moral in character), such as 'Be polite', that are also normally observed by participants in talk exchanges, and these may also generate nonconventional implicatures. "

https://www.ucl.ac.uk/ls/studypacks/Grice-Logic.pdf

THE BASIC ASSUMPTION

It is generally assumed that at some level, the speaker is always observing the cooperative principle, even if this is not evident from what is literally said, i.e., what is literally said does not coincide with the maxims.

THE BASIC ASSUMPTION

If the addressee assumes the speaker is following the maxims, but that this is not evident at a literal level, then the addressee infers additional meaning (in the form of an implicature) to make up the difference.

In other words, what is literally said + the implicature together satisfy the maxims.

CONVERSATIONAL IMPLICATURE

In pragmatics, conversational implicature is an indirect or implicit speech act: what is meant by a **speaker's utterance** that is not part of what is explicitly said.
The term is also known simply as **implicature**;
it is the antonym (opposite) of **explicature**, which is an explicitly communicated assumption.

SOME KEY TERMS

implicature: an additional meaning conveyed by a speaker adhering to the co-operative principle

indirect speech act: an action in which the form used (e.g. interrogative) does not directly match the function (e.g. request) performed by a speaker with an utterance, in contrast to a direct speech act.

inference: additional information used by a listener/reader to create a connection between what is said and what must be meant.

CONVERSATIONAL IMPLICATURE

"The term **implicature** is taken from the philosopher H.P. Grice), who developed the theory of the cooperative principle.
On the basis that a speaker and listener are cooperating, and aiming to be relevant, a speaker can imply a meaning implicitly, confident that the listener will understand.

Procedure of working out a conversational implicature

1. The speaker (S) said that p.
2. The hearer (H) has no reason to suppose the S is not observing the conversational maxims or at least the CP.
3. (2) implies that S thinks that q.
4. S knows, and knows that H knows that S knows that H understands that it necessary to suppose that S thinks that q.
5. S has done nothing to stop H to think that q.
6. S wants H to think that q.
7. Therefore, S has implicated that q.

Procedure of working out a conversational implicature

More specifically,

the working out of a conversational implicature relies on the following conditions (Grice 1975: 50):

(1) the conventional meaning of the word;

(2) the CP and the conversational maxims;

(3) the linguistic context;

(4) (the) background knowledge;

(5) the fact that (1) to (4) are available to S and H.

Procedure of working out a conversational implicature

three concepts of Grice's theory:
- ❑ what is said,
- ❑ conventional implicatures
- ❑ and conversational implicatures.

The difference between what is said and what is implicated lies in the truth- vs. non-truth-conditional aspect of meaning: implicature, either conventional or conversational, is a non-truth-conditional aspect of meaning.

Procedure of working out a conversational implicature

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- ❑ and conversational implicatures.

The difference between what is said and what is implicated lies in the truth- vs. non-truth-conditional aspect of meaning: implicature, either conventional or conversational, is a non-truth-conditional aspect of meaning.

Procedure of working out a conversational implicature

Grice defined two further distinctions.

The first one concerns what he calls **non-conventional implicatures.**

If conversational implicature are non-conventional, in that they require a working out procedure, this gives rise to a final type of non-conventional implicatures, which are also non-conversational: they are triggered by "other maxims (aesthetic, social, or moral in character) such as 'Be polite' " (Grice 1975: 47).

Procedure of working out a conversational implicature

Grice defined two further distinctions.
The first one concerns what he calls **non-conventional implicatures.**

Tania: 'Jacques, can you read the pragmatics test?'
Jacques: 'Can you put it on my desk?'

Procedure of working out a conversational implicature

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Tania: 'Jacques, can you read the pragmatics test?'
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Procedure of working out a conversational implicature

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The first one concerns what he calls **non-conventional implicatures.**

Tania: 'Jacques, can you read the pragmatics test?'
Jacques: 'Can you put it on my desk?'
In fact:

Jacques, pouvez-vous lire l'examen de pragmatique?
Peux-tu le poser sur mon bureau?

Procedure of working out a conversational implicature

Grice defined two further distinctions.
The first one concerns what he calls **non-conventional implicatures.**

Jacques, pouvez-vous lire l'examen de pragmatique?
Peux-tu le poser sur mon bureau?
Tu therefore non-conversationally implicates a proximal social relationship, whereas the use of vous non-conversationally implicates a distal social relationship.

Procedure of working out a conversational implicature

Grice defined two further distinctions.

The first one concerns what he calls **non-conventional implicatures.**

Second, Grice introduces a distinction between two types of conversational implicatures:

generalized as opposed to **particularized implicatures**.

# Procedure of working out a conversational implicature

Second, Grice introduces a distinction between two types of conversational implicatures:
generalized as opposed to **particularized implicatures**.

A particularized implicature is an implicature "carried by saying that p on a particular occasion *in virtue of a special feature of the context*" (Grice 1975: 56).

On the contrary, **generalized conversational implicatures** are implicatures that are "NORMALLY carried by saying that p" (Grice 1975: 56).

WHAT IS CONVEYED

WHAT IS SAID   WHAT IS IMPLICATED

CONVENTIONALLY   NONCONVENTIONALLY

CONVENTIONAL
IMPLICATURE

CONVERSATIONALLY   NONCONVERSATIONALLY

GENERALLY   PARTICULARLY

CONVERSATIONAL
GENERALIZED
IMPLICATURE

CONVERSATIONAL
PARTICULARIZED
IMPLICATURE

conversational implicature

Conversational Implicatures are

(i)   calculable,

(ii) cancellable,

(iii) non-detachable,

(iv) non-conventional,

(v) carried not by what is said but by the

      speech act, and

(vi) indeterminate

conventional implicature

Conversely, conventional implicatures are
(i)   non-calculable,
(ii) non-cancelable,
(iii) detachable,
(iv) conventional,
(v)   carried by what is said and
(vi) determinate.

(1) Calculability:
Conversational implicatures (CONVERSATIONALS) are calculable, because they are the result of a working-out procedure. Conventional implicatures (CONVENTIONALS are not calculable, because they are triggered by the meaning of the words that carried them.
(ii) Cancellability: CONVERSATIONALS are cancellable, because they do not contribute to the truth conditions of the utterance. They can therefore be cancelled without contradiction. CONVENTIONALS cannot, because they are conventional and cannot be cancelled without contradiction.

(iii) Detachability: CONVERSATIONALS are non-detachable, because the implicature is attached to the content of the utterance rather than to the form of the expression that triggers it. So, in CONVERSATIONALS, the implicature cannot be detached from the content of the utterance.

(iv) Conventionality: By definition, CONVENTIONALS are conventional, since they are attached to the conventional meaning of the word. Generalised CONVERSATIONALS are not conventional, because they are non-detachable, cancellable, and not carried by what is said, but by the act of saying.

(v) Saying: CONVERSATIONALS are the by-product of the meaning of a sentence, the CP, the conversational maxims, and the act of saying a particular sentence on a particular occasion. The pragmatic meaning of any expression in CONVERSATIONALS(generalized or particularized) is therefore the result of the utterance act.

CONVENTIONALS are not dependant of this condition, because the implicature is attached to the word.

(vi) Determinacy: Whereas CONVENTIONALS s are determinate (because they are conventional), CONVERSATIONALS are not. This means that a precise content cannot be attached to the implicature

Figure 2: Implicatures, semantics and pragmatics

Sadock (1978: 284)

CONVERSATIONAL IMPLICATURE

For example

Thus a possible <mark>conversational implicature</mark> of *Are you watching this program?*

Bas Aarts, Sylvia Chalker, and Edmund Weiner,
Oxford Dictionary of English Grammar, 2nd ed. Oxford University Press, 2014

CONVERSATIONAL IMPLICATURE

For example

Thus a possible <mark>conversational implicature</mark> of *Are you watching this program?* might well be 'This program bores me. Can we turn the television off?' "

Bas Aarts, Sylvia Chalker, and Edmund Weiner,
Oxford Dictionary of English Grammar, 2nd ed. Oxford University Press, 2014

CONVERSATIONAL IMPLICATURE

Some implicatures are due to the conventional meaning of the words used, and do not depend on any special features of the conversation. Conversational implicatures, on the other hand, depend on features of the conversational situation or context and not just on the conventional meanings of the words used.

CONVERSATIONAL IMPLICATURE

Conversational implicatures are inferences that depend on the existence of norms for the use of language, such as the widespread agreement that communicators should aim **to tell the truth**. (It is for historical reasons that conversational is part of the label.

Implicatures arise as much in other speech genres and in writing as they do in conversation; so they are often just called implicatures.)

CONVERSATIONAL IMPLICATURE

There are basically 2 types of implicature:

❑ general / conventional conversational implicature and
❑ particular / particularized conversational implicature.

Their difference lies in the degree of background knowledge dependence in inferring the speaker meaning: Normally the former needs less than the latter.

CONVERSATIONAL IMPLICATURE

•Normally, we assume, following the **Cooperative Principle**, that, where speakers have a scale of values at their disposal, they will choose the one that is truthful (maxim of quality) and optionally informative (maxim of quantity).

•And normally we draw the implicature "not any of the higher values on the scale."

•Such drawn implicatures do not require an extra knowledge to extract the meaning, hence these are viewed as generalized conversational implicatures.

CONVERSATIONAL IMPLICATURE

- A **generalized conversational implicature** occurs where "the use of a certain forms of words in an utterance would normally (in the absence of special circumstances) carry such-and-such an implicature or type of implicature".

CONVERSATIONAL IMPLICATURE

Grice's first example is a sentence of the form

"X is meeting a woman this evening."

Anyone who utters this sentence, in absence of special circumstances, would be taken to implicate that the woman in question was someone other than X's "wife, mother, sister, or perhaps even close platonic friend". Being an implicature, it could be cancelled, either implicitly, in appropriate circumstances, or explicitly, adding some clause that implies its denial.

Implicature requiring extra background knowledge in inference

A: How is Jane's husband?

B: Let's go into that gate to the garden there.

=> (We can't discuss it here.)

A: Want some fudge brownies?

B: There must be 20,000 calories there.

=> (I am not going to eat it.)

Tom: Where's the salad dressing?

Gabriela: We've run out of olive oil.

=> (There isn't any salad dressing)

Properties of Conversational Implicatures

- Cancellability
  - They can be cancelled, explicitly or contextually.
- Non-detachability
  - It will not be possible to find another way of saying the same thing, which simply lacks the implicature in question (except in the case of some Manner implicatures).
- Non-conventionality
  - Initially at least, conversational implicata are not part of the meaning of the expressions to the employment of which they attach.
  - The implicature is not carried by what is said, but only by the saying of what is said, or by 'putting it that way.'
- Calculability
  - There may be multiple ways of calculating an implicature, which is why they often possess an indeterminacy.

Examples of Standard Implicatures

Quality Implicatures

a. John has two PhD's

→ I believe John has two PhD's, and have adequate evidence that he has.

b. Does your farm contain 400 acres?

→ I don't know that your farm does contain 400 acres, and I want to know if it doe

Examples of Standard Implicatures

Quantity Implicatures

a. Nigel has fourteen children

➡ Nigel has no more than fourteen children

b. The flag is white

➡ The flag is only white

c. A:How did Harry fare in court today?

   B:Oh, he got a fine

➡ He got no more than a fine.

Examples of Standard Implicatures

Quantity Implicatures

How does it work?

- by using the less informative word or phrase, the speaker does not seem to be observing the maxim of quantity in what he has said.

- But the addressee still assumes that the maxims are being observed.

Examples of Standard Implicatures

Relation Implicatures

a. Pass the salt

➡️ Pass the salt now

b.

A:Can you tell me the time?

B:Well, the milkman has come

➡️ The time now is right after the time the milkman arrived.

Examples of Standard Implicatures

Manner Implicatures

a. A: How do I get into you apartment?

   B: Walk up to the front door, turn the door handle clockwise as far as it will go, and then pull gently towards you.

   ⟹   Pay particular attention and care to each step of the instructions I've given you.

Mechanics of Implicatures

i. The speaker has said that p

ii. If by saying p, the speaker does not appear to be observing the maxims, literally, the addressee nevertheless assumes the speaker is observing the maxims

iii. For S to say that p and be indeed observing the maxims, S must think q

Mechanics of Implicatures

iv. S has done nothing to stop the addressee from inferring that q

v. Therefore S intends the addressee to infer that q, and so in saying that p has implicated q.

Hedges and Flouting

There is a way for the speaker to tactfully opt out of a maxim using a special word or phrase called a hedge.

Hedges and Flouting

Hedge— a phrase that eliminates or at least mitigates one of the maxims.

In using a hedge, the speaker effectively says he is not implicating q.

Hedges

i	a.Quantity	As far as I know; I'm not sure if this is true, but... ; Well, I may be wrong, but...
ii	b.Quality	As you probably already know; I can't say any more; I probably don't need to say this, but... .
iii	c.Relation	Oh, by the way; I'm not sure if this is relevant, but...; I don't want to change the subject, but...
iv	d.Manner	I'm not sure if this is clear, but...; I don't know if this makes sense, but...; This may be a bit tedious, but....

Flouting

There is another way in which the speaker can signal to the addressee that he is going to ignore a maxim.

It is called a flout and it too carries a conversational implicature, sometimes called a conversational implicature

Flouting a maxim is typically done by uttering something absurdly false, wholly uninformative, completely irrelevant, or abstruse so that the addressee understands the speaker is implying something entirely different. This is how metaphors get resolved.

Flouting

A speaker who makes it clear that they are not following the conversational maxims is said to be flouting the maxims and this too gives rise to an implicature.
That is, the addressee understands the speaker flouted the maxims for a reason and infers further meaning from this breach of convention.

Flouting Quality

a. A: What if the USSR blockades the Gulf and all the oil?

   B: Oh come now, Britain rules the seas! [sarcasm]
   ➡ There is nothing Britain can do about it.

b. A: Tehran's in Turkey, isn't it, teacher?
    B: And London's in Armenia, I suppose
    ➡ Tehran [teə'rɑːn] is not in Turkey.

Flouting Quantity

a. War is War

➡️ Terrible things happen in war. That's it's nature and there's no use lamenting that tragedy.

b. Either John will come or he won't

➡️ I don't care whether or not John comes.

Flouting Relation

a. A: (Letter of Recommendation)
What qualities does John have for this position?
B: John has nice handwriting.

➡ John is not qualified for the job

b. A: Susan can be such a cow sometimes!
B: Lovely weather, isn't it?

➡ B finds A's comment inappropriate (for some reason or other).

Gricean maxims

Apparent violations of the norm of truthfulness (referred to below as the "quality maxim") can invite metaphorical interpretation, as when a reader finds a way to reconcile the real-world unlikelihood of someone's face curdling with an assumption that Jenny Diski aimed to make a true statement when she wrote 'my mother's face curdled'.

Flouting Manner

a. The Corner of John's lips turned slightly upwards.
➡ John did not exactly smile.
b. Miss singer produced a series of sounds corresponding closely to an aria from Rigoletto.
➡ Miss singer did not perform well.

Gricean maxims

Speakers, writers and addressees assume that everyone engaged in communication knows and accepts the **communicational norms.**
This general acceptance is an important starting point for **inferences**, even if individuals are sometimes unable to meet the standards or occasionally cheat (for instance, by telling lies).

H. P. Grice
Conversational Implicature

A: How is C getting on in his job [at the bank]?

B: Oh quite well, I think; he likes his colleagues, and he hasn't been to prison yet.

i. **What is the implicature?**

    i.   *While A hasn't been to prison, he is the sort of person who could easily end up there.*

    ii.   *What is a Conversational Implicature as opposed to Strictly Speaking?*

implicature
[ˈɪmplɪˌkətʃə, -ˌkeɪtʃə]

The English philosopher H. Paul Grice (1913-1988) introduced the notion of 'conversational implicatures' which are <u>implications</u> deduced by speakers during conversations.

implicature
[ˈɪmplɪˌkətʃə, -ˌkeɪtʃə]

Implicature is the action of implying a meaning beyond the literal sense of what is explicitly stated,
for example saying 'The frame is nice'
and implying …

implicature
[ˈɪmplɪ ˌkətʃə, - ˌkeɪtʃə]

Implicature is the action of implying a meaning beyond the literal sense of what is explicitly stated,
for example saying 'The frame is nice'
and implying 'I don't like the picture in it'.

implicature
[ˈɪmplɪˌkətʃə, -ˌkeɪtʃə]

Implicature refers to what is suggested in an utterance, even though not expressed nor strictly implied by the utterance.
"Have you stopped going to the gym?"

implicature
[ˈɪmplɪˌkətʃə, -ˌkeɪtʃə]

According to Grice, utterance interpretation is not a matter of decoding messages, but rather involves
(1) taking the meaning of the sentences together with contextual information;
(2) using inference rules;
(3) working out what the speaker means on the basis of the assumption that the utterance conforms to the maxims

implicature
[ˈɪmplɪˌkətʃə, -ˌkeɪtʃə]

Implicature generates inferences beyond the semantic content of the sentences uttered. Implicature:"Implicature" refers to what is suggested in an utterance, even though not expressed nor strictly implied by the utterance

implicature
[ˈɪmplɪˌkətʃə, -ˌkeɪtʃə]

The main advantage of this approach from Grice's point of view is that it provides a pragmatic explanation for a wide range of phenomena, especially for conversational implicatures --- a kind of extra meaning that is not literally contained in the utterance.

implicature
[ˈɪmplɪˌkətʃə, -ˌkeɪtʃə]

Ex. (1) Husband: Where are the car keys?
According to Grice, conversational implicatures can arise from either strictly and directly observing or deliberately and openly flouting the maxims, that is, speakers can produce implicatures in two ways:
❑ observance of the maxims,
❑ and non-observance of the maxims.
.

implicature
[ˈɪmplɪ ˌkətʃə, - ˌkeɪtʃə]

(1) Husband: Where are the car keys?
Wife: They're on the table in the hall.
The wife has answered clearly (manner) and truthfully (Quality), has given just the right amount of information (Quantity) and has directly addressed her husband's goal in asking the question (Relation). She has said precisely what she meant, no more and no less.

implicature
[ˈɪmplɪ ˌkətʃə, - ˌkeɪtʃə]

Generalized conversational implicature
• A speaker can use the Maxim of Quantity to invite the <u>inference</u> that no more can be said, as in:
Al: I hope you brought the bread and the cheese.
Sue: I brought the cheese.

➡️ I didn't bring the bread
• this creates a Generalized conversational implicature: "<u>Sometimes</u> I regret I moved to Moscow" implies/ means "I normally don't".

implicature
[ˈɪmplɪ ˌkətʃə, - ˌkeɪtʃə]

Particularized conversational implicature
• A speaker might also violate the Maxim of Relation to force the hearer to draw a special conclusion, as in:
Sue: *Are you coming to the big party tonight?*
Al: *My parents are visiting.*
⟹ *I am not coming. I simply can't come.*
This answer implies/ means '*I'm not coming*'
• Grice calls this a
Particularized conversational implicature.

implicature
[ˈɪmplɪˌkətʃə, -ˌkeɪtʃə]

Conventional implicatures

• Grice also identifies <u>Conventional implicatures</u>

connected to particular words:

Even George came to the party.

This word implies/ means:

➡ *It was a bit unexpected.*

Judy hit Al and he cried

➡ Al cried after Judy hit him and <u>because</u> she hit him

Scalar implicature
[ˈɪmplɪˌkətʃə, -ˌkeɪtʃə]

For Grice,
scalar implicatures were a species of
generalized conversational implicatures.

Scalar implicature
[ˈɪmplɪˌkətʃə, -ˌkeɪtʃə]

Subtype of conversational implicatures
a. Jill has got **some** of Chomsky's papers.
=> b. The speaker believes that Jill hasn't got all of Chomsky's papers.
a. The Russians **or** the Americans have just landed on Mars.
=> b. Not both of them have just landed on Mars.

Scalar implicature
[ˈɪmplɪˌkətʃə, -ˌkeɪtʃə]

Subtype of conversational implicatures
a. X: I like Mary. She's intelligent and good-hearted.
a. Y: She's intelligent.
⇒b. Y doesn't think Mary is good-hearted.

a. She won't necessarily get the job.
⇒b. She will possibly get the job.

The Cooperative Principle and the Maxims

- **The Cooperative Principle /CP/**
    - Make your conversational contribution such as is required, at the stage at which it occurs, by the accepted purpose or direction of the talk exchange in which you are engaged.
- **Specific Maxims**
    - Quality: make contribution 1) as informative and 2) not more informative than required.
    - Quality: don't say 1) what you believe to be false and 2) that for which you lack adequate evidence.
    - Relation: Be relevant
    - Manner: 1) avoid obscurity; 2) avoid ambiguity; 3) be brief; 4) be orderly.
    - Others? Aesthetic, social, or moral, be polite, ...
- **Cultural Differences:** What is relevant, polite, true will vary from culture to culture.

A man who by saying that p [he's not in jail] has implicated q [he's likely to steal money] may be said to have conversationally implicated q provided that:

1. He is presumed to have followed the maxims or at least the CP.

2. The supposition that he is aware that (q) is required in order to make his saying (p) consistent with this presumption;

3. The speaker thinks that it is within the hearer to workout that the supposition is required.

4. And not what happens if it does not.

Conventional Schema
(things that are assumed to be in place)

- The conventional meaning of the words used, together with the identity of any references that may be involved.

- The CP and its maxims

- The context, linguistic or otherwise, of the utterance;

- Other items of background knowledge; and

- The fact … that all relevant items falling under the previous headings are available to both participants and both participants know or assume this to be the case.

Group A: No maxims violated

- **Petrol Example**
  - A: I am out of petrol. B: There is a garage around the corner.
  - B would be infringing the maxim of "be relevant" unless he thinks that A can by petrol at the garage.
- **Jail example**: presumption that connection between implication and prison statement is obvious.
- **The Smith Example**
  - A: Smith doesn't seem to have a girlfriend these days. B: He has been paying a lot of visits to New York lately.
  - In this example too, the speaker implicates that which he must be assumed to believe in order to preserve the assumption that he is observing the maxim of relation.

Group B: Conflict between Maxims

An example in which a maxim is violated, but its violation is to be explained by the supposition of a clash with another maxim.

- A: Where does C live? B: Somewhere in the south of France.

- B is being vague (violating maximum of quantity by saying less) because to be more informative he would have to say something he does not know thus violating the maxim of quality.

Group C: Flouting

Examples that involve exploitation, that is a procedure by which a maxim is flouted for the purpose of getting in a conversational implicature by means of something of the nature of a figure of speech.

- Letter of recommendation: Dear Si, Mr X's command of English is excellent, and his attendance at tutorials has been regular. Yours, etc.

- President: "I never had sex with that woman."

- Flouting allows one to say things through implicature without actually saying it (without directly lying).

- "Since the truth of a conversational implicatum is not required by the truth of what is said (...) The implicature is not carried by what is said, but only by the saying of what is said, or by 'putting it that way."

The Universality of the CP and Maxims

- Grice assumes the the CP and the maims are universal
- We may also add that while universal they may not act in the same way.
  - Different background knowledge.
  - Different ways of resolving conflicts (Group B) or flouting (Group C).
  - Do you really think I look nice in this outfit?
- Explain breakdowns in cross-cultural communication.
- The utility of these maxims in ordinary conversation.

Basis for the cooperative principle

- If it is universal is it genetic?
- If it is not genetic, why is it there and how.
- The social contract.

Geoffrey Leech Politeness Principle

CHECK YOUSELF!

https://learningapps.org/display?v=p
vywyzihk20

Erving Goffman: On Face-Work: An analysis of Ritual Social Interaction

- The concept of face:
  - The presentation of the self to the other.
  - Could be in positive or negative terms.
- Everyday terms
  - Maintaining face, Loose Face, Wrong face, Out of face, Poise, Save face, Give face
  - **Line**: a specific type of face in a specific situation.
- Basic structural feature of social interaction.

FACE

The concept of face was derived from Chinese into English in the 19th century.

"Face" can be conceptualized as an individual's positive claim of social values in socializing contact was introduced into academia by Erving Goffman through his theories of "face" and "facework".

Goffman, Erving. 1955. On Face-Work: An analysis of ritual elements in social interaction, Psychiatry: Journal of Interpersonal Relations 18:3, pp. 213–231.

FACE

According to Brown and Levinson's assumption in politeness theory based on Goffman's "face", one's face is categorized into two forms: positive and negative.

Brown and Levinson defined positive face two ways: as "the want of every member that his wants be desirable to at least some others executors" (p. 62),

or alternatively, "the positive consistent self-image or 'personality' (crucially including the desire that this self-image be appreciated and approved of) claimed by interactants" (p. 61).

Brown, Penelope and Stephen C. Levinson. 1987. *Politeness: Some universals in language usage*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. [First published 1978 as part of Esther N. Goody (ed.): Questions and Politeness. Cambridge University Press

FACE

Negative face was defined as "the want of every 'competent adult member' that his actions be unimpeded by others", or "the basic claim to territories, personal preserves, rights to non-distraction—i.e. the freedom of action and freedom from imposition". Whereas positive face involves a desire for connection with others, negative face needs include autonomy and independence.

Brown, Penelope and Stephen C. Levinson. 1987. *Politeness: Some universals in language usage*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. [First published 1978 as part of Esther N. Goody (ed.): Questions and Politeness. Cambridge University Press

FACE

Brown characterized positive face by desires to be liked, admired, ratified, and related to positively, noting that one would threaten positive face by ignoring someone. At the same time, she characterized negative face by the desire not to be imposed upon, noting that negative face could be impinged upon by imposing on someone.

Positive face refers to one's self-esteem, while negative face refers to one's freedom to act.

FACE

These **two aspects of face** are the basic wants in any social interaction; during any social interaction.

So a certain sort of cooperation is needed amongst the participants **to maintain each other's face**.

Participants can do this by using positive politeness and negative politeness, which pay attention to people's positive and negative face needs respectively.

FTA

A face threatening act is an act that inherently damages the face of the addressee or the speaker by acting in opposition to the wants and desires of the other.

FTA

Face threatening acts can be

➢ (1) verbal (using words/language),

➢ (2) paraverbal (conveyed in the characteristics of speech such as tone etc.),

➢ (3) or non-verbal (facial expression, etc.).

Negative face-threatening acts

Negative face is threatened when an individual does not avoid or intend to avoid the obstruction of their interlocutor's freedom of action.

It can cause damage to either the speaker or the hearer, and makes one of the interlocutors submit their will to the other.

Freedom of choice and action are impeded when negative face is threatened.

Negative face-threatening acts

Examples of negative FTA damaging the Hearer:

orders, requests, suggestions, advice, remindings, threats, or warnings.

Stop it!

You can't touch this!

How can you say that?

Listen to me, guy!

Don't forget to say "Thank you"!

Don't go!

You'd better shut your mouth…

Positive face-threatening acts

Positive face is threatened when the speaker or hearer does not care about their interactor's feelings, wants, or does not want what the other wants.

Positive face threatening acts can also cause damage to the speaker or the hearer.

When an individual is forced to be separated from others so that their well being is treated less importantly, positive face is threatened.

Positive face-threatening acts

Examples of positive FTA damaging the Hearer:

disapproval, criticism, contempt or ridicule, complaints and reprimands, accusations, insults.

It could be an act that expresses the speaker's indifference toward the addressee's positive face.

Positive face-threatening acts

Examples of positive FTA damaging the Speaker:

It could be an act that shows that the speaker is in some sense wrong, has own dignity offended, or unable to control himself.

Politeness strategies

Politeness strategies are used to formulate messages in order to save the hearer's positive face when face-threatening acts are inevitable or desired.

Brown and Levinson outline four main types of politeness strategies:

I.   bald on-record,

II. negative politeness,

III. positive politeness,

IV. and off-record (indirect)

V. as well as simply not using the face-threatening act.

Brown and Levinson Politeness Principle

CHECK YOUSELF!

https://learningapps.org/display?v=p5ojq9kyk20

Face-work

- **Rule of self respect**:
  - One is expected to maintain face
- **Rule of considerateness**:
  - person must go to certain lengths to save the feelings and the face of others present.
- **The Face-Threatening Act.**
  - Something that does damage to one's face.
- **Face Work:**
  - Maintaining face; correcting dammage
  - Often habitualized, Cultural variation, Individual variation

Basic Kinds of Facework

- **Total avoidance** to avoid possible FTA
- **Defensive measures**:   avoidance; Shift topics; suppress feelings; hedging feelings, …
- **Protective maneuvers**:
  - Show respect and politeness; Show discretion about feelings on topics that might embarrass others; Employs circumlocutions and deceptions; Employs courtesies; joking manner; neutralize offending activities by explaining them in advance.
- **Denial** of FTA or the face threatening nature of the incident.
- **Loss of control** (ironically) others may protectively turn away from him to give him time to assemble himself.

The Corrective Process

When participants find themselves in an established state of ritual disequilibrium or disgrace, and an attempt is made to re-establish a satisfactory ritual state for them.

- **Ritual: one's face is a sacred thing**
- **The Stages**
  - **Acknowledgement:** Begins with acknowledge threat to face.

    (The interchange: seems to be a basic concrete unit of social activity.0
  - **The challenge**: participants call attention to the misconduct
  - **The offering:** whereby a participant, typically the offender, is given a chance to correct for the offence and re-establish the expressive order.
    - explain as a meaningless act, a joke, unintentional, a mistake, unavoidable, not acting himself, under the influence of something or somebody
  - **The acceptance** (or not) by the offended of offering
  - **Gratitude** by the offender (ritual equilibrium re-established)

Variations

- The offender patently refuses to heed the warning and continues with the offending behavior.
- Possibly calling offended's bluff: Untenable position because face for offender cannot be derived from it.
  - The offender withdraws in a visible huff (showing righteous indignation)
  - Emotions play an important part in this process.
  - both ways of salvaging face, but with high costs
- Some cultures apologize freely others with reluctance.
  - The Liberian apology:
    - I'm sorry your feelings were hurt when I said that.

The Game

- Every face-saving practice which is allowed to neutralize a particular threat opens up the possibility that the threat will be willfully introduced for what can be gained by it.
  - If a person knows that his modesty will be answered by other's praise for him, he can fish for complements.
  - He can arrange for favorable events to appear.
  - Sudden withdrawal leading to need for repair.
- Cooperation in face-work

The Ritual Roles of the Self: Two senses:

- – The self as an image pieced together from the expressive implication of the full flow of events in an undertaking;
- – The self as a player [agent] in a ritual game who copes honorably or dishonorably, diplomatically or undiplomatically, with the judgmental contingencies of the situation.
- – Add this perspective to the view of the Self by G.H. Mead.
- – Human need to be social

So what?

- Universal human nature is not a very human thing. By acquiring it, the person becomes a kind of construct, built up, not from inner psychic propensities, but from moral rules that are impressed upon him from without.

- The general capacity to be bound by moral rules may well belong to the individual, but the particular set of rules which transforms him into a human being derives from requirements established in the ritual organization of social encounters. [*the social contract*]

- Similarly, the human nature of a particular set of persons may be specifically designed for the special kind of undertakings in which they participate [e.g., cultural varition].

Politeness:
Brown and Levinson

- Assumptions
- Based on Goffman's concept of face
  - Face: The public self-image that every member wants to claim for himself.
  - A communication (speech act) may contain an imposition on the "face" of the Hearer.
- Language Universals extend beyond the confines of grammar.

Two types of face: Positive and Negative

- **Positive Face: Honor**
  - The public self.
  - The positive consistent self-image or 'personality' (crucially including the desire that this self-image be appreciated and approved of) by interactants.
  - the want of every member that his wants be desirable to at least some others.
- Similar to the perspective of "me" of Mead,
- The "honor" of Weber.

- **Negative Face: Privacy**
  - Invented by Brown and Levinson
  - The concept of the right to privacy.
  - The basic claim to territories, personal preserves, rights to non-distraction
  - the want of every 'competent adult member' that his actions be unimpeded by others.

- Similar to the perspective of the "I" of Mead
- Similar to freedom of action and freedom of imposition.

Intrinsic FTAs

- It follows that "certain kinds of acts intrinsically threaten face ... when they "run contrary to the wants of the addressee or speaker.

First Distinction: Kinds of face threatened

- **S threatens H's Negative Face [imposition]**

- Those that put pressure on H to act: Orders and Requests; Suggestions and Advice; Reminders; Threats and warnings.

- Those that put H in debt (offers, promises)

- Those that expression desire or envy of H's possessions which lead H to think that he has to protect them (complements, envy, expressions of strong emotion (hatred, anger, lust))

- **S threatens H's Positive face**

- negative evaluation: disapproval(criticism); disagreement

- indifference to H's positive face: violent emotions (reason to fear S); irreverence; bad news about H (good news about S); raising divisive topics (politics); non-cooperation; wrong terms of address

Second distinctions:

Threats to H's face versus threats to S's

- **Those that offend S's negative Face**

- S expressing thanks, S acceptance of H's thanks; S's excuses; S acceptance of offers; S's response to H's faux pas; unwilling promises and offers

- **Those that damage S's positive face**

- apologies; acceptance of a complement; breakdown of physical control, self-humiliation, confessions, emotional leakage

Strategies for doing FTAs	On Record (directly Com-municating the FTA directly and un-equivocally (I promise to ...)	Without redressive action, baldly	
		With redressive action Redress: action that gives face to addressee by attempting to counteracting the potential face damage of the FTE	Positive politeness Oriented toward the positive face of H [honor]
			Negative politeness Oriented toward redressing the negative face [privacy]
	Off Record (indirect): This strategy: involves some ambiguity so that H is not obligated to respond (Damn, I'm out of cash cf. Grice.		
Don't do the FTA			

Sociological variables (331)

- Computing the Weightiness of an FTA

- Wx = D(S,H) + P (H,S) + Rx

- D = Social Distance between S and H for the purposes of that act and as determined by such things as the frequency of interaction and the kinds of material and nonmaterial goods exchanged....

- P = Power differential (Weber's sense). Degree to which H can impose his own plans and own face at the expense of S's plans and face.

- "I think you will take me to the store."

Conclusion: Pragmatics

- Austin: Speech Acts (Illocutionary Acts)
  - The linkages of these acts with institutions (Bourdieu).
  - The range of vocabulary in any language that have to do with speech acts.
- Grice:The Cooperative Principle and conversational Maxims
  - A Universal that is pragmatically grounded
  - Helps explain implicature and variation
- Goffman: Face
  - Activities involved in the presentation of self
  - Pragmatically based universal
- Brown and Levinson: Politeness (positive and negative face)
  - Types of strategies for interaction.
  - Positivistic rules. (structuralist?
  - Universals versus cultural variation?

Recommended Reading

- Grice H.P. (1975), "Logic and Conversation", in Cole & Morgan 1975: 41–58. Reprinted in Grice 1989: 22–40. Link: Grice1975.doc (sfu.ca)

- PRAGMATICS by George Yule
  Link: PRAGMATICS George Yule 1 DEFINITIONS AND (present5.com)

- The Study of Language by George Yule (206), pp. 112-123.

https://drive.google.com/file/d/0B0c54RghLylwU3JPR1NlZ0hhWGc/view

Highly Recommended Reading

- Brown, Penelope and Stephen C. Levinson. 1987. *Politeness: Some universals in language usage*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. [First published 1978 as part of Esther N. Goody (ed.): Questions and Politeness. Cambridge University Press.
- Goffman, Erving. 1955. On Face-Work: An analysis of ritual elements in social interaction, Psychiatry: Journal of Interpersonal Relations 18:3, pp. 213–231.
- John Searle (1975) "Indirect speech acts." ibid. Reprinted in Pragmatics: A Reader, ed. S. Davis, pp. 265–277. Oxford: Oxford University Press. (1991)

Have a big time!

Thank you!