

Tema 4. Language use in context


Weeks 19–21

Language use in context: pragmatics,
Speech Act Theory,
Grice's Maxims,
politeness theory;

'Introduction to English Language aims to give students a broad overview of some of the main areas of study involved in the discipline of linguistics: the study of language, i.e. ...

"- a solid basis in language analysis from which to proceed".

Satori Soden, EN1023, 2012, p.1 ;



Pragmatics is

- ❑ “The study of the relation of signs to their interpreters. ” (Charles Morris)
- ❑ “The study of contextual meaning communicated by a speaker or writer, and interpreted by a listener or reader. ” (G. Yule)
- ❑ • “The study of the relations between linguistic forms and its users(...) Only pragmatics allows humans into the analysis: their assumptions, purposes, goals, and actions they perform while speaking. ” (G. Yule)

Pragmatics

- Austin – How to do things with words
- Grice – The Cooperative Principle + implicature
- Goffman – Face
- Brown and Levinson – Politeness
- Wierzbicka – Culture and Cognition

J. L. Austin How to do things with words.

- Locutionary Acts
 - Saying something about something
- Illocutionary acts
 - Doing something by saying something
 - Performatives.
- Perlocutionary Acts



Performatives

1. The uttering of the words is .. the performance of which is also the object of the utterance.
2. Circumstances around the performative must be appropriate
 1. good faith v. bad faith
 2. Other things have to go right (happy) (felicities)
 3. Must be an accepted conventional procedure
 4. Particular persons must be appropriate for the invocation of the act
 5. Procedure must be executed correctly and completely
 6. Person must have those thoughts and feelings requisite of the act
 7. Must actually conduct themselves subsequently.
3. Sinning against rules will make the performance **unhappy**
4. **Explicit** (I bet, I promise, ...) versus **Implicit** performatives (where the performative is only a possibility (might, perhaps, (you might be wrong)
5. **Entails** (all men blush) versus **Implies** versus **Presupposes** (all Jacks children are bald presupposes that Jack has children.

Examples of Austin's Performatives

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1. Verdictives: Delivering a verdict,
judgement official or unofficial, acquit, convict, find (as a matter of fact), hold, interpret as, understand, read it as, rule, calculate, reckon, estimate, locate, place, date, measure, put it at, make it, take it, grade, rank, rate, assess, value, describe, characterize, diagnose, analyze.
2. Exercitives: Giving a decision in favor or against a certain course of action from a position of power.
appoint, degrade, demote, dismiss, excommunicate, name, order, command, direct, sentence, fine, grant, levy, vote for, nominate, choose, claim, give, bequeath, pardon, resign, warn, advise, plead, pray, entreat, beg, urge, press, recommend, proclaim, announce, quash, countermand, annul, repeal, enact, reprieve, veto, dedicate, declare closed, declare open
3. Comissives: Commits the speaker to a course of action; implies obligation
promise, covenant, contract, undertake, bind myself, give my word, ...
4. Behabitives: Adopting an attitude in reaction to the behavior of others
1) apologize, 2) thank, 3) sympathy 4) attitudes 5) greetings, 6) wishes, 7) challenges (dare, defy, protest, challenge).
5. Expositives: Expounding one's views, clarifying
 - 1. affirm, deny, state, describe, class, identify; 2. remark, mention,

Examples of Austin's Performatives भग तार

Verdictives	I state my judgement
Exercitives:	I exercise my power
Comissives:	I take on an obligation
Behabitives	I express my reaction to other's doing
Expositives:	I am expounding my views, clarifying

Points to remember

- Austin demonstrated that while some words were used to describe things (a locutionary act), other words (and sentences) did things.
- The variety of words on the previous slide point this out clearly.
- Austin's work introduced a new field of language study now known as **pragmatics**.
- Bourdieu pointed out that conditions of the performative are all associated with the **social institution**.

Institutions (Bourdieu) and Speech Acts

1. Roles:

1. Particular persons must be appropriate for the invocation of the act

2. Practices:

1. Must be an accepted conventional procedure
2. Must be executed correctly and completely

3. Other Considerations

1. Sincerity: Person must have those thoughts and feelings requisite of the act
2. Consistency: Must actually conduct themselves subsequently.

The history of pragmatics can be described as a conjunction of different moves,
coming from epistemology and semiotics (Morris 1938),
philosophy of language:
(Austin 1962; Searle 1969),
logic:
(Frege [1892]1952; Russell 1905),
and linguistics:
(Horn 1972; Wilson 1975; Kempson 1975; Gazdar 1979).

Basic pragmatics was initially linked to reference and presupposition (Frege and Russell), semantic and pragmatic presuppositions (Wilson and Kempson; Stalnaker 1977), and illocutionary acts (Austin and Searle), and it was only in the mid-70s that the main pragmatics topic, implicatures, was introduced in Grice's seminal and programmatic article *Logic and Conversation*.

https://www.researchgate.net/publication/260319066_Conversational_and_conventional_implicatures [accessed May 24 2021].

The first issue of a journal devoted to pragmatics was the third issue of Peter Cole's and Jerry Morgan's *Syntax and Semantics* (1975), which is renowned for the fact that certain of Grice's fundamental articles, as well as John Searle's *Indirect Speech Acts*, were published there. Three and six years later, Peter Cole edited two collections and the eighth issue of *Syntax and Semantics* (*Pragmatics*) and *Radical Pragmatics*. Both publications contained articles by Grice, respectively *Further Note on Logic and Conversation* and *Presupposition and Conversational Implicature*.

https://www.researchgate.net/publication/260319866_Conversational_and_conventional_implicatures [accessed May 24 2021].


These three books explicitly show how the domain of pragmatics changed very quickly, moving from classic philosophical issues such as speech acts to more linguistic concerns including presupposition, information structure, discourse, and irony. It is a striking fact that in less than ten years **the concept of implicatures** has become the core concept of the new pragmatic perspective on meaning.

https://www.researchgate.net/publication/260319006_Conversational_and_conventional_implicatures [accessed May 24 2021].

H. P. Grice (1913-88) Cooperative Principle

Make your contribution such as is required,
at the stage at which it occurs, by the
accepted purpose or direction of the talk
exchange in which you are engaged.

Grice (1975, 45)



MEANING

In linguistics, and particularly in structural linguistics, meaning results from a set of conventions that define a specific natural language. According to Saussure, for instance, “*Le signe linguistique unit non une chose et un nom, mais un concept et une image acoustique*” (Saussure 1968: 98).

1 It is a well-known fact that the relationship between the signifiant (acoustic image) and the signifié (concept) is arbitrary and unmotivated.

This is similar to the classic Chomskyan view of language, which defines grammar as a system in which strings of sounds and strings of meanings interface.

https://www.researchgate.net/publication/260319066_Conversational_and_conventional_implicatures [accessed May 24 2021].

MEANING

In other words, the linguistic belief system states that meaning is one part of the linguistic sign (Saussure) as well as one aspect of grammar, computed at the intentional-conceptual interface (Hauser, Chomsky, and Fitch 2002)

https://www.researchgate.net/publication/260319066_Conversational_and_conventional_implicatures [accessed May 24 2021].

MEANING

In *Logic and Conversation (1975)*, Grice makes a very general distinction between **what is said** by a speaker and **what he means** or **implicates**. Let us begin with one of his famous examples:

https://www.researchgate.net/publication/269319066_Conversational_and_conventional_implicatures [accessed May 24 2021].

MEANING

“Suppose that A and B are talking about a mutual friend, C, who is now working in a bank. A asks B how C is getting on in his job, and B replies, **Oh quite well, I think; he likes his colleagues, and he hasn't been in prison yet.**” (Grice 1975: 43). Now what is interesting is Grice's comment: “I think it is clear that whatever B **implied, suggested, meant, etc.**, in this example, is distinct from **what B said**, which was **simply that C had not been in prison yet**” (Grice 1975: 43)

https://www.researchgate.net/publication/260319066_Conversational_and_conventional_implicatures [accessed May 24 2021].

MEANING

In his words, “In the sense in which I am using the word say, I intend what someone has said to be closely related to the conventional meaning of the word (the sentence) he has uttered” (Grice 1975: 44).

https://www.researchgate.net/publication/260319066_Conversational_and_conventional_implicatures [accessed May 24 2021].

MEANING

As what is said must be understood in terms of what philosophers define as meaning, that is, sense and reference, what is said is the result of a linguistic computation implying the description of a full proposition with a truth value.

https://www.researchgate.net/publication/260319066_Conversational_and_conventional_implicatures [accessed May 24 2021].

MEANING

“Mentioning, or referring to, something is a characteristic of a use of an expression, as ‘being about’ something, and truth-or-falsity, are characteristics of a use of a sentence” (Strawson 1971: 180)

https://www.researchgate.net/publication/269319066_Conversational_and_conventional_implicatures [accessed May 24 2021].

MEANING

This implies that Grice's idea of **what is said** cannot be restricted to a merely linguistic notion of logical form: **it is a full proposition with a truth value**, as implied in the work of Austin and Strawson. It was also used by Searle in his seminal article on literal meaning (Searle 1979: 117), when he stated that "... **the notion of literal meaning of a sentence only has application relative to a set of contextual or background assumptions (...)**".

https://www.researchgate.net/publication/260319096_Conversational_and_conventional_implicatures [accessed May 24 2021].

MEANING

one part of non-natural meaning is what is said, which can be reduced to the **truth-conditional aspect of meaning**, while the other part is the **non-truth-conditional aspect of meaning**, known as implicature

https://www.researchgate.net/publication/260315906_Conversational_and_conventional_implicatures [accessed May 24 2021].

MEANING

Manage: Masha managed to start the car.

Entailment: Masha started the car.

Conventional implicature: It required some effort to start the car. Masha made some effort to start the car.

Fail: Bush failed to read the report. (Karttunen and Zaenen 2005)

Entailment: Bush did not read the report.

Conventional implicature: Bush had an opportunity and tried, or should have tried, to read it.

Still: Alfred has still not come. (from Frege 1918),

Entailment: Alfred has not come.

Conventional implicature: Alfred was expected to have come by now.

MEANING

Too:

Manfred Krifka was in Moscow last spring too.

Entails: Manfred Krifka was in Moscow last spring.

Conventionally implicates:

Some other given person was in Moscow last spring

MEANING

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https://www.researchgate.net/publication/269319066_Conversational_and_conventional_implicatures [accessed May 24 2021].

MEANING

Even Bill likes Mary

The word even does not have anything with truth and reference...

https://www.researchgate.net/publication/260319065_Conversational_and_conventional_implicatures [accessed May 24 2021].

MEANING

Even Bill likes Mary

The word even does not have anything with truth and reference...

Bill likes Mary

Bill is the least likely to like Mary.

Bill is the last person likely to like Mary.

https://www.researchgate.net/publication/260319066_Conversational_and_conventional_implicatures [accessed May 24 2021].

MEANING


Even Bill likes Mary

The test for a conventional implicature is the ‘*but’ test, which leads to a contradiction when but introduce the negation of one of the conventional implicatures

*Even Bill likes Mary, but no one else does. (??)

https://www.researchgate.net/publication/260319066_Conversational_and_conventional_implicatures [accessed May 24 2021].

TYPES OF SPOKEN MEANING



TYPES OF SPOKEN MEANING

The concept “presupposition” was raised by the eminent German logician Frege in 1892.

Presupposition refers to the implicit information of proposition embedded in a sentence or utterance.


TYPES OF SPOKEN MEANING

Truth-conditional semantics is an approach which studies the propositional meaning of sentences and the logical conditions for establishing their truth or falsity, (Finch, 2000: 184).

TYPES OF SPOKEN MEANING


Truth-conditional semantics is an approach which studies the propositional meaning of sentences and the logical conditions for establishing their truth or falsity, (Finch, 2000: 184).

‘John's brother has just come back from Nigeria.’ (p)·

 ‘John has a brother.’ (q)

Presupposition survives under negation as in:·


‘John's brother hasn't just come back from Nigeria’(p1)
still presupposes:·

 ‘John has a brother.’ (q)

TYPES OF SPOKEN MEANING


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‘John's brother has just come back from Nigeria.’ (p)·

 ‘John has a brother.’ (q)

Presupposition survives under negation as in:·

‘John's brother hasn't just come back from Nigeria’(p1)
still presupposes:·

 ‘John has a brother.’ (q)

TYPES OF SPOKEN MEANING

Pragmatists, on the other hand, argue that in addition to literal meaning, the sentence or utterance conveys a host of indirect information that can be pragmatically inferred. Presuppositions are one part of that information. Stalnaker (1974) has introduced the term ‘pragmatic presupposition’ in an influential early article where he establishes the fact that in order to correctly interpret an utterance, with respect to its truth and falsity, a context is needed, e.g., (cited in Mey, 1993: 202)

TYPES OF SPOKEN MEANING


Jackendoff (1972) proposes the presupposition of a sentence to denote “the information in the sentence that is assumed by the speaker to be shared by him and the hearer”. The following examples illustrate the notion:

- a. Betty remembered to take her medicine.
- b. Betty did not remember to take her medicine.
- c. Betty was supposed to take her medicine.

PRESUPPOSITION TRIGGERS

A **presupposition trigger** is a lexical item or linguistic construction which is responsible for the presupposition.

PRESUPPOSITION TRIGGERS



PRESUPPOSITION TRIGGERS

Existential presupposition:

a. Mary's dog is cute.

→ b. There exists someone called Mary

→ a. That Mary has a dog.

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PRESUPPOSITION TRIGGERS

	LEXICAL PRESUPPOSITION TRIGGERS		PRESUPPOSITION
1	implicative verbs	a. John managed to open the door.	
2	Factive verbs or smth presupposing the truth)	b. She didn't realize he was ill. c. I regret to admit...	b. I wasn't aware that she was married.
3	Change of state verbs	a. Judy started smoking cigars. b. Judy started smoking cigars.	a.... didn't use to ... b. ... used to ...
4	Verbs of judging	Accuse, criticize etc.	

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PRESUPPOSITION TRIGGERS

	LEXICAL PRESUPPOSITION TRIGGERS		PRESUPPOSITION
5	Counter-factual verbs	a. Max is pretending that he is sick.	=>b. Max is not sick.
6	Conventional items	I cleaned the room	⇒ The room needed cleaning.
7	Iteratives	<p>a. Bill drank another cup of tea.</p> <p>a. The flying saucer came/didn't come again. => b. Bill had drunk at least one.</p> <p>=>b. The flying saucer came before.</p>	

PRESUPPOSITION TRIGGERS

	STRUCTURAL PRESUPPOSITION TRIGGERS		PRESUPPOSITION
1	Cleft constructions	What I need is love It is your hand I need.	
2	Wh-questions	When did he leave?	He left.
3	Adverbial clauses	a. She wrote the book when she lived in Boston	b. She lived in Boston
4	Comparative constructions	a. Carol is /isn't a better linguist than Barbara.	b. Barbara is a linguist
5	Counterfactual conditionals	a. If you were my friend, you would have helped me.	b. You are not my friend
6	Non-restrictive clauses	The Proto-Harrappans, who flourished 2800-2650 B.C., were/were not great temple builders.	⇒ The Proto- Harrappans flourished 2800-2650 B.C.

Entailment versus inference

Entailment: A type of sense relations Definition:
IF when Proposition A is true, Proposition B must
therefore be true, THEN Proposition A ENTAILS
Proposition B

4-example Proposition A: 'John is a bachelor.'

Proposition B: 'John is not married.'

IF A is true, B must be true. 'John is a bachelor'
ENTAILS 'John is not married.'

Inference: Any conclusion that one can reasonably
draw from sentences or utterances.

**All entailments are inferences, but NOT all inferences
are entailment!**

Gricean Cooperative Principle

- The Cooperative Principle:
 - Make your contribution such as is required, at the stage at which it occurs, by the accepted purpose or direction of the talk exchange in which you are engaged.

Gricean maxims

The Cooperative Principle includes the four Maxims of Conversation

i	Quality	Try to make your contribution one that is true
ii	Quantity	Make your contribution as informative and no more so than is required.
iii	Relation	Be relevant
iv	Manner	Be perspicuous [pə'spɪkjʊəs] – i.e. clearly expressed and easily understood; lucid.

Gricean maxims

The Cooperative Principle includes the four Maxims of Conversation		
i	Quality	<p>Try to make your contribution one that is true.</p> <ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. Do not say what you believe to be false. 2. Do not say that for which you lack adequate evidence.
ii	Quantity	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. Make your contribution as informative as is required. 2. Do not make your contribution more information than is required.
iii	Relation	Be relevant!
iv	Manner	<p>Be perspicuous [pə'spɪkjʊəs] – i.e. clearly expressed and easily understood; lucid.</p> <p>Be perspicuous. 1. Avoid obscurity of expression.</p> <p>2. Avoid ambiguity. 3. Be brief. 4. Be orderly.</p>

Gricean maxims

The Maxims of Quality

- i. Do not say what you believe to be false
- ii. Do not say that for which you lack adequate evidence

Gricean maxims

The Maxims of Quantity

- i. Make your contribution as informative as is required (for the current purposes of the exchange);
- ii. Do not make your contribution more informative than is required;

Gricean maxims

The Maxims of Relation

Be relevant!

Gricean maxims

The Maxims of Manner

- i. Avoid obscurity of expression
- ii. Avoid ambiguity
- iii. Be brief (avoid unnecessary prolixity)
- iv. Be orderly

Gricean maxims

CHECK YOURSELF!

<https://learningapps.org/display?v=p4pwyrt6a20>



Gricean maxims

The speaker may **exploit the maxims**, that is,

- (i) violate the maxims,
- (ii) opt out of both the maxims and the CP,
- (iii) face a clash by fulfilling one maxim and violating another, and
- (iv) flout a maxim.

Flout Gricean Maxims

CHECK YOURSELF!

<https://learningapps.org/display?v=pk8i8than21>



Gricean maxims

The speaker may **exploit the maxims**, that is,

- (i) I have little money with me.
- (ii) I cannot say more; my lips are sealed.
- (iii) A: Where does Mary's mother live?
B: Somewhere in the South of France.
- (iv) War is war.

Gricean maxims

A: “I was bitten by something in Berlin Zoo.”

B: “Was it an insect?” A: “Yes.”

The inferences called implicatures are ever-present in language use, but, unlike entailments, they are not guarantees.

In saying ‘I could have been wrong in my guess’ – an implicature – that A did not know quite what had bitten her in the zoo, or over the further implicature that it was an insect that had bitten her.

Gricean maxims

The maxims operate as a type of baseline for a conversation, allowing hearers to make inferences based on speaker intention and implied meaning. This is called conversational implicature. This does not mean, however, that the conversational maxims are adhered to all of the time.

On the contrary, there are many occasions on which they are not, but when this happens, hearers (or readers) consider whether the non-adherence is significant in itself – in other words, whether we can make certain inferences when they are not adhered to.

Four things to do with CP

In a conversation, the speaker may do **one of four things** with regards to the cooperative principle and the maxims:

Four things to do with CP

- i. The speaker may **observe the maxims**—this is the default assumption.
- ii. The speaker may **opt out of a maxim** by using a phrase that eliminates or mitigates the effect of the maxims and signals this to the addressee—this phrase is called a hedge.
- iii. The speaker may **flout a maxim**, to the full knowledge of the addressee
- iv. The speaker may **violate a maxim**, e.g., **lie**.

Four things to do with CP

If the speaker chooses to do the last, (iv), he is ignoring the cooperative principle without giving the addressee a cue that he is doing so.

Grice's Confession

“I have stated my maxims as if this purpose were a maximally effective exchange of information”

<https://www.ucl.ac.uk/lis/studypacks/Grice-Logic.pdf>

Grice H. P. (1975), Logic and conversation, Syntax and semantics, Num. 3: Speech acts, Academic Press, New York

Grice's Confession

“There are characteristically, to some degree at least, **cooperative efforts**; and each participant recognizes in them, to some extent, a common purpose or set of purposes, or at least a mutually accepted direction.”

<https://www.sfu.ca/~jeffpell/Cogs300/GriceLogicConvers75.pdf>

Grice's Confession

“I wish to represent a certain subclass of nonconventional implicatures, which I shall call CONVERSATIONAL implicatures, as being essentially connected with certain general features of discourse”

<https://www.sfu.ca/~jeffpell/Cogs300/GriceLogicConvers75.pdf>

Grice's Confession

“There are, of course, all sorts of other maxims (aesthetic, social, or moral in character), such as ‘Be polite’, that are also normally observed by participants in talk exchanges, and these may also generate nonconventional implicatures. ”

<https://www.ucl.ac.uk/lis/studypacks/Grice-Logic.pdf>

THE BASIC ASSUMPTION

It is generally assumed that at some level, the speaker is always observing the **cooperative principle**, even if this is not evident from what is literally said, i.e., what is literally said does not coincide with the maxims.

THE BASIC ASSUMPTION

If the addressee assumes the speaker is following the maxims, but that this is not evident at a literal level, then the addressee infers additional meaning (in the form of an implicature) to make up the difference.

In other words, what is literally said + the implicature together satisfy the maxims.

CONVERSATIONAL IMPLICATURE

In pragmatics, conversational implicature is an **indirect or implicit speech act**: what is meant by a **speaker's utterance** that is not part of what is explicitly said. The term is also known simply as **implicature**; it is the antonym (opposite) of **explicature**, which is an explicitly communicated assumption.

SOME KEY TERMS

implicature: an additional meaning conveyed by a speaker adhering to the co-operative principle

indirect speech act: an action in which the form used (e.g. interrogative) does not directly match the function (e.g. request) performed by a speaker with an utterance, in contrast to a direct speech act.

inference: additional information used by a listener/reader to create a connection between what is said and what must be meant.

CONVERSATIONAL IMPLICATURE

"The term **implicature** is taken from the philosopher H.P. Grice), who developed the theory of the cooperative principle.

On the basis that a speaker and listener are cooperating, and aiming to be relevant, a speaker can imply a meaning implicitly, confident that the listener will understand.

Procedure of working out a conversational implicature

1. The speaker (S) said that p.
2. The hearer (H) has no reason to suppose the S is not observing the conversational maxims or at least the CP.
3. (2) implies that S thinks that q.
4. S knows, and knows that H knows that S knows that H understands that it necessary to suppose that S thinks that q.
5. S has done nothing to stop H to think that q.
6. S wants H to think that q.
7. Therefore, S has implicated that q.

Procedure of working out a conversational implicature

More specifically,
the working out of a conversational implicature relies on the following conditions (Grice 1975: 50):

- (1) the conventional meaning of the word;
- (2) the CP and the conversational maxims;
- (3) the linguistic context;
- (4) (the) background knowledge;
- (5) the fact that (1) to (4) are available to S and H.

Procedure of working out a conversational implicature

three concepts of Grice's theory:

- ❑ what is said,
- ❑ conventional implicatures
- ❑ and conversational implicatures.

The difference between what is said and what is implicated lies in the truth- vs. non-truth-conditional aspect of meaning: implicature, either conventional or conversational, is a non-truth-conditional aspect of meaning.

Procedure of working out a conversational implicature

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Procedure of working out a conversational implicature

Grice defined two further distinctions.

The first one concerns what he calls **non-conventional implicatures**.

If conversational implicature are non-conventional, in that they require a working out procedure, this gives rise to a final type of non-conventional implicatures, which are also non-conversational: they are triggered by “other maxims (aesthetic, social, or moral in character) such as ‘Be polite’ ” (Grice 1975: 47).

Procedure of working out a conversational implicature

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Tania: 'Jacques, can you read the pragmatics test?'

Jacques: 'Can you put it on my desk?'

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In fact:

Jacques, **pouvez-vous** lire l'examen de pragmatique?

Peux-tu le poser sur mon bureau?

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Procedure of working out a conversational implicature

Grice defined two further distinctions.

The first one concerns what he calls **non-conventional implicatures**.

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generalized as opposed to **particularized implicatures**.


Procedure of working out a conversational implicature

Second, Grice introduces a distinction between two types of conversational implicatures:

generalized as opposed to **particularized implicatures**.

A **particularized implicature** is an implicature “carried by saying that p on a particular occasion *in virtue of a special feature of the context*” (Grice 1975: 56).

On the contrary, **generalized conversational implicatures** are implicatures that are “NORMALLY carried by saying that p” (Grice 1975: 56).



conversational implicature

Conversational Implicatures are

- (i) calculable,
- (ii) cancellable,
- (iii) non-detachable,
- (iv) non-conventional,
- (v) carried not by what is said but by the speech act, and
- (vi) indeterminate

conventional implicature

Conversely, conventional implicatures are

- (i) non-calculable,
- (ii) non-cancelable,
- (iii) detachable,
- (iv) conventional,
- (v) carried by what is said and
- (vi) determinate.

(1) Calculability:

Conversational implicatures (CONVERSATIONALS) are calculable, because they are the result of a working-out procedure. Conventional implicatures (CONVENTIONALS) are not calculable, because they are triggered by the meaning of the words that carried them.

(ii) Cancellability: CONVERSATIONALS are cancellable, because they do not contribute to the truth conditions of the utterance. They can therefore be cancelled without contradiction. CONVENTIONALS cannot, because they are conventional and cannot be cancelled without contradiction.

(iii) Detachability: CONVERSATIONALS are non-detachable, because the implicature is attached to the content of the utterance rather than to the form of the expression that triggers it. So, in CONVERSATIONALS, the implicature cannot be detached from the content of the utterance.

(iv) Conventionality: By definition, CONVENTIONALS are conventional, since they are attached to the conventional meaning of the word. Generalised CONVERSATIONALS are not conventional, because they are non-detachable, cancellable, and not carried by what is said, but by the act of saying.

(v) Saying: **CONVERSATIONALS** are the by-product of the meaning of a sentence, the CP, the conversational maxims, and the act of saying a particular sentence on a particular occasion. The pragmatic meaning of any expression in **CONVERSATIONALS** (generalized or particularized) is therefore the result of the utterance act.

CONVENTIONALS are not dependant of this condition, because the implicature is attached to the word.

(vi) Determinacy: Whereas **CONVENTIONALS** are determinate (because they are conventional), **CONVERSATIONALS** are not. This means that a precise content cannot be attached to the implicature




Figure 2: Implicatures, semantics and pragmatics

Sadock (1978: 284)

CONVERSATIONAL IMPLICATURE

For example

Thus a possible conversational implicature of
Are you watching this program?

Bas Aarts, Sylvia Chalker, and Edmund Weiner,
Oxford Dictionary of English Grammar, 2nd ed. Oxford University Press, 2014

CONVERSATIONAL IMPLICATURE

For example

Thus a possible conversational implicature of *Are you watching this program?* might well be 'This program bores me. Can we turn the television off?' "

Bas Aarts, Sylvia Chalker, and Edmund Weiner,
Oxford Dictionary of English Grammar, 2nd ed. Oxford University Press, 2014

CONVERSATIONAL IMPLICATURE

Some implicatures are due to the conventional meaning of the words used, and do not depend on any special features of the conversation.

Conversational implicatures, on the other hand, depend on features of the conversational situation or context and not just on the conventional meanings of the words used.

CONVERSATIONAL IMPLICATURE

Conversational implicatures are inferences that depend on the existence of **norms for the use of language**, such as the widespread agreement that communicators should aim **to tell the truth**. (It is for historical reasons that conversational is part of the label.

Implicatures arise as much in other speech genres and in writing as they do in conversation; so they are often just called implicatures.)

CONVERSATIONAL IMPLICATURE

There are basically 2 types of implicature:

- ❑ general / conventional conversational implicature and
- ❑ particular / particularized conversational implicature.

Their difference lies in the degree of background knowledge dependence in inferring the speaker meaning: Normally the former needs less than the latter.

CONVERSATIONAL IMPLICATURE

- Normally, we assume, following the **Cooperative Principle**, that, where speakers have a scale of values at their disposal, they will choose the one that is truthful (maxim of quality) and optionally informative (maxim of quantity).
- And normally we draw the implicature “not any of the higher values on the scale.”
- Such drawn implicatures do not require an extra knowledge to extract the meaning, hence these are viewed as generalized conversational implicatures.

CONVERSATIONAL IMPLICATURE

- A **generalized conversational implicature** occurs where "the use of a certain forms of words in an utterance would normally (in the absence of special circumstances) carry such-and-such an implicature or type of implicature".

CONVERSATIONAL IMPLICATURE

Grice's first example is a sentence of the form

"X is meeting a woman this evening."

Anyone who utters this sentence, in absence of special circumstances, would be taken to implicate that the woman in question was someone other than X's "wife, mother, sister, or perhaps even close platonic friend".

Being an implicature, **it could be cancelled**, either implicitly, in appropriate circumstances, or explicitly, adding some clause that implies its denial.

Implicature requiring extra background knowledge in inference

A: How is Jane's husband?

B: Let's go into that gate to the garden there.

=> (We can't discuss it here.)

A: Want some fudge brownies?

B: There must be 20,000 calories there.

=> (I am not going to eat it.)

Tom: Where's the salad dressing?

Gabriela: We've run out of olive oil.

=> (There isn't any salad dressing)

Properties of Conversational Implicatures

- **Cancellability**
 - They can be cancelled, explicitly or contextually.
- **Non-detachability**
 - It will not be possible to find another way of saying the same thing, which simply lacks the implicature in question (except in the case of some Manner implicatures).
- **Non-conventionality**
 - Initially at least, conversational implicatures are not part of the meaning of the expressions to the employment of which they attach.
 - The implicature is not carried by what is said, but only by the saying of what is said, or by 'putting it that way.'
- **Calculability**
 - There may be multiple ways of calculating an implicature, which is why they often possess **an indeterminacy**.

Examples of Standard Implicatures

Quality Implicatures

a. John has two PhD's

→ I believe John has two PhD's, and have adequate evidence that he has.


b. Does your farm contain 400 acres?

→ I don't know that your farm does contain 400 acres, and I want to know if it doe


Examples of Standard Implicatures

Quantity Implicatures

a. Nigel has fourteen children


 Nigel has no more than fourteen children

b. The flag is white

 The flag is only white

c. A: How did Harry fare in court today?

B: Oh, he got a fine

 He got no more than a fine.

Examples of Standard Implicatures

Quantity Implicatures


How does it work?

- by using the less informative word or phrase, the speaker does not seem to be observing the maxim of quantity in what he has said.
- But the addressee still assumes that the maxims are being observed.

Examples of Standard Implicatures

Relation Implicatures

a. Pass the salt




Pass the salt now

b.

A: Can you tell me the time?

B: Well, the milkman has come




The time now is right after the time the milkman arrived.

Examples of Standard Implicatures

Manner Implicatures

a. A: How do I get into you apartment?

B: Walk up to the front door, turn the door handle clockwise as far as it will go, and then pull gently towards you.

 Pay particular attention and care to each step of the instructions I've given you.

Mechanics of Implicatures

- i. The **speaker** has said that **p**
- ii. If by saying **p**, the speaker does not appear to be observing the maxims, literally, the addressee nevertheless assumes the speaker is observing the maxims
- iii. For **S** to say that **p** and be indeed observing the maxims, **S** must think **q**

Mechanics of Implicatures

iv. **S** has done nothing to stop the addressee from inferring that **q**

v. Therefore **S** intends the addressee to infer that **q**, and so in saying that **p** has implicated **q**.

Hedges and Flouting

There is a way for the speaker to tactfully opt out of a maxim using a special word or phrase called a hedge.

Hedges and Flouting

Hedge— a phrase that eliminates or at least mitigates one of the maxims.

In using a hedge, the speaker effectively says he is not implicating q.

Hedges

i	a.Quantity	As far as I know; I'm not sure if this is true, but... ; Well, I may be wrong, but...
ii	b.Quality	As you probably already know; I can't say any more; I probably don't need to say this, but... .
iii	c.Relation	Oh, by the way; I'm not sure if this is relevant, but...; I don't want to change the subject, but...
iv	d.Manner	I'm not sure if this is clear, but...; I don't know if this makes sense, but...; This may be a bit tedious, but....

Flouting

There is another way in which the speaker can signal to the addressee that he is going to ignore a maxim.

It is called **a flout** and it too carries a conversational implicature, sometimes called a **conversational implicature**

Flouting a maxim is typically done by uttering something absurdly false, wholly uninformative, completely irrelevant, or abstruse so that the addressee understands the speaker is implying something entirely different. This is how metaphors get resolved.

Flouting

A speaker who makes it clear that they are not following the conversational maxims is said to be flouting the maxims and this too gives rise to an implicature.

That is, **the addressee** understands the speaker flouted the maxims for a reason and **infers further meaning from this breach of convention.**

Flouting Quality

a. A: What if the USSR blockades the Gulf and all the oil?

B: Oh come now, Britain rules the seas!
[sarcasm]

➡ There is nothing Britain can do about it.

b. A: Tehran's in Turkey, isn't it, teacher?

B: And London's in Armenia, I suppose

➡ Tehran [teə'rɑ:n] is not in Turkey.

Flouting Quantity

a. War is War

➡ Terrible things happen in war.
That's its nature and there's no use
lamenting that tragedy.

b. Either John will come or he won't

➡ I don't care whether or not John
comes.

Flouting Relation

a. A: (Letter of Recommendation)

What qualities does John have for this position?

B: John has nice handwriting.

➡ John is not qualified for the job

b. A: Susan can be such a cow sometimes!

B: Lovely weather, isn't it?

➡ B finds A's comment inappropriate (for some reason or other).

Gricean maxims

Apparent violations of the norm of truthfulness (referred to below as the “quality maxim”) can invite metaphorical interpretation, as when a reader finds a way to reconcile the real-world unlikelihood of someone’s face curdling with an assumption that Jenny Diski aimed to make a true statement when she wrote ‘my mother’s face curdled’.

Flouting Manner

a. The Corner of John's lips turned slightly upwards.

➡ John did not exactly smile.

b. Miss singer produced a series of sounds corresponding closely to an aria from Rigoletto.

➡ Miss singer did not perform well.

Gricean maxims

Speakers, writers and addressees assume that everyone engaged in communication knows and accepts the **communicational norms**.

This general acceptance is an important starting point for **inferences**, even if individuals are sometimes unable to meet the standards or occasionally cheat (for instance, by telling lies).

The Cooperative Principle and the Maxims

- **The Cooperative Principle /CP/**
 - Make your conversational contribution such as is required, at the stage at which it occurs, by the accepted purpose or direction of the talk exchange in which you are engaged.
- **Specific Maxims**
 - Quality: make contribution 1) as informative and 2) not more informative than required.
 - Quality: don't say 1) what you believe to be false and 2) that for which you lack adequate evidence.
 - Relation: Be relevant
 - Manner: 1) avoid obscurity; 2) avoid ambiguity; 3) be brief; 4) be orderly.
 - Others? Aesthetic, social, or moral, be polite, ...
- **Cultural Differences:** What is relevant, polite, true **will vary from culture to culture.**

A man who by saying that p [he's not in jail] has implicated q [he's likely to steal money] may be said to have conversationally implicated q provided that:

1. He is presumed to have followed the maxims or at least the CP.
2. The supposition that he is aware that (q) is required in order to make his saying (p) consistent with this presumption;
3. The speaker thinks that it is within the hearer to workout that the supposition is required.
4. And not what happens if it does not.

Conventional Schema

(things that are assumed to be in place)

- The conventional meaning of the words used, together with the identity of any references that may be involved.
- The CP and its maxims
- The context, linguistic or otherwise, of the utterance;
- Other items of background knowledge; and
- The fact ... that all relevant items falling under the previous headings are available to both participants and both participants know or assume this to be the case.

Group A: No maxims violated

- **Petrol Example**

- A: I am out of petrol. B: There is a garage around the corner.
- B would be infringing the maxim of “be relevant” unless he thinks that A can buy petrol at the garage.

- **Jail example:** presumption that connection between implication and prison statement is obvious.

- **The Smith Example**

- A: Smith doesn't seem to have a girlfriend these days. B: He has been paying a lot of visits to New York lately.
- In this example too, the speaker implicates that which he must be assumed to believe in order to preserve the assumption that he is observing the maxim of relation.

Group B: Conflict between Maxims

An example in which a maxim is violated, but its violation is to be explained by the supposition of a clash with another maxim.

- A: Where does C live? B: Somewhere in the south of France.
- B is being vague (violating maximum of quality by saying less) because to be more informative he would have to say something he does not know thus violating the maxim of quality.

Group C: Flouting

Examples that involve exploitation, that is a procedure by which a maxim is flouted for the purpose of getting in a conversational implicature by means of something of the nature of a figure of speech.

- Letter of recommendation: Dear Si, Mr X's command of English is excellent, and his attendance at tutorials has been regular. Yours, etc.
- President: "I never had sex with that woman."
- Flouting allows one to say things through implicature without actually saying it (without directly lying).
- "Since the truth of a conversational implicatum is not required by the truth of what is said (...) The implicature is not carried by what is said, but only by the saying of what is said, or by 'putting it that way.'"

The Universality of the CP and Maxims

- Grice assumes the the CP and the maims are universal
- We may also add that while universal they may not act in the same way.
 - Different background knowledge.
 - Different ways of resolving conflicts (Group B) or flouting (Group C).
 - Do you really think I look nice in this outfit?
- Explain breakdowns in cross-cultural communication.
- The utility of these maxims in ordinary conversation.

Basis for the cooperative principle

- If it is universal is it genetic?
- If it is not genetic, why is it there and how.
- The social contract.

H. P. Grice


Conversational Implicature

A: How is C getting on in his job [at the bank]?

B: Oh quite well, I think; he likes his colleagues, and he hasn't been to prison yet.

i. **What is the implicature?**

- i. *While A hasn't been to prison, he is the sort of person who could easily end up there.*
- ii. *What is a Conversational Implicature as opposed to Strictly Speaking?*



implicature

['implɪˌkətʃə, -ˌkeɪtʃə]

The English philosopher H. Paul Grice (1913-1988) introduced the notion of '**conversational implicatures**' which are implications deduced by speakers during conversations.

implicature

['implɪˌkətʃə, -ˌkeɪtʃə]

Implicature is the action of implying a meaning beyond the literal sense of what is explicitly stated,
for example saying ‘The frame is nice’
and implying ...

implicature

['implɪ,kətʃə, -keɪtʃə]

Implicature is the action of implying a meaning beyond the literal sense of what is explicitly stated,

for example saying 'The frame is nice'
and implying 'I don't like the picture in it'.

implicature

['implɪˌkətʃə, -ˌkeɪtʃə]

Implicature refers to what is suggested in an utterance, even though not expressed nor strictly implied by the utterance.

“Have you stopped going to the gym?”

implicature

['implɪˌkətʃə, -ˌkeɪtʃə]

Implicature **generates inferences** beyond the semantic content of the sentences uttered.

Implicature: “**Implicature**” refers to what is **suggested in an utterance**, even though not expressed nor strictly implied by the utterance

implicature

['implɪˌkətʃə, -ˌkeɪtʃə]

According to Grice, utterance interpretation is not a matter of decoding messages, but rather involves

- (1) taking the meaning of the sentences together with contextual information;
- (2) using inference rules;
- (3) working out what the speaker means on the basis of the assumption that the utterance conforms to the maxims

implicature

['implɪˌkətʃə, -ˌkeɪtʃə]

The main advantage of this approach from Grice's point of view is that it provides a **pragmatic explanation for a wide range of phenomena**, especially for conversational implicatures --- a kind of **extra meaning** that is not literally contained in the utterance.

implicature

['implɪ,kətʃə, -keɪtʃə]

Ex. (1) Husband: Where are the car keys?

According to Grice, conversational implicatures can arise from either strictly and directly observing or deliberately and openly flouting the maxims, that is, speakers can produce implicatures in two ways:

- ❑ observance of the maxims,
- ❑ and non-observance of the maxims.

implicature

['implɪ,kətʃə, -keɪtʃə]

(1) Husband: Where are the car keys?

Wife: They're on the table in the hall.

The wife has answered clearly (manner) and truthfully (Quality), has given just the right amount of information (Quantity) and has directly addressed her husband's goal in asking the question (Relation). She has said precisely what she meant, no more and no less.

implicature

['implɪˌkətʃə, -ˌkeɪtʃə]

Generalized conversational implicature

- A speaker can use the Maxim of Quantity to invite the inference that no more can be said, as in:

Al: I hope you brought the bread and the cheese.

Sue: I brought the cheese.



I didn't bring the bread

- this creates a Generalized conversational implicature:
“Sometimes I regret I moved to Moscow” implies/
means “I normally don’t”.

implicature


['implɪˌkətʃə, -ˌkeɪtʃə]

Particularized conversational implicature

- A speaker might also violate the Maxim of Relation to force the hearer to draw a special conclusion, as in:

Sue: *Are you coming to the big party tonight?*

Al: *My parents are visiting.*

 *I am not coming. I simply can't come.*

This answer implies/ means '*I'm not coming*'

- Grice calls this a

Particularized conversational implicature.

implicature

['implɪ,kətʃə, -keɪtʃə]


Conventional implicatures

- Grice also identifies Conventional implicatures


connected to particular words:

Even George came to the party.

This word implies/ means:

 *It was a bit unexpected.*

Judy hit Al and he cried

 Al cried after Judy hit him and because
she hit him

Scalar implicature

['implɪ,kətsə, - ,keɪtsə]

For Grice,
scalar implicatures were a species of
generalized conversational implicatures.

Scalar implicature

['implɪˌkətʃə, -ˌkeɪtʃə]

Subtype of conversational implicatures

a. Jill has got **some** of Chomsky's papers.

=> b. The speaker believes that Jill hasn't got all of Chomsky's papers.

a. The Russians **or** the Americans have just landed on Mars.

=> b. Not both of them have just landed on Mars.

Scalar implicature

['implɪ,kətsə, - ,keɪtsə]

Subtype of conversational implicatures

a. X: I like Mary. She's intelligent and good-hearted.

a. Y: She's intelligent.

⇒ b. Y doesn't think Mary is good-hearted.

a. She won't necessarily get the job.

⇒ b. She will possibly get the job.

IMPLICATURES

भग तार

Speaking means that we express the meaning through language, and this meaning usually divide into two parts, that is :

- The literal meaning
- The implied meaning

According to the content, it includes two groups:

- The direct speaking content
 - The direct speaking content → The literal meaning
 - The indirect speaking content
- The indirect speaking content → The implied meaning
The implied meaning → implicature (???)

IMPLICATURES

भग तार

The implicature in conversation → conversational implicature

The term "Implicature" accounts for what a speaker can imply, suggest or mean, as distinct from what the speaker literally says (Grice, 1975).

Implicature is a technical term, which refers to what is suggested in an utterance, even though neither expressed nor strictly implied, for example:

John is meeting a woman this evening.

> The woman John is meeting this evening is not his mother, his sister or his wife.

Implicature is one of the ways that one proposition can be conveyed by a speaker uttering or under appropriate.

IMPLICATURES

भग तार

Implicature includes two types which are:

- ❑ **conversational implicature**
- ❑ and **conventional implicature**

.

Conversational Implicature

Conversational implicature: implications derived on the basis of conversational principles and assumptions, relying on more than the linguistic meaning of words in a sentence. I

t derives from the **cooperative principle of conversation** and a number of **maxims** expected to be followed by participants in a speech event.

Conversational Implicature

Example 1:

Student A: *Do you like Phonetics?*

Student B: *Well, let's just say I don't jump for joy before class.*

A asked B about his feelings about the class, and B said B didn't celebrate before the class. It shows the uninterested feeling of B about *Phonetics* subject.

Conversational Implicature

Implicatures arise from the interaction of the following 3 factors:

1. **The proposition** actually expressed in the utterance
2. Possibly certain features of **the context** (in any of the 3 notions of 'context')
3. **The assumption** that the speaker is obeying **the rules** of conversation to the best of their ability.

Example: A 'standard' implicature (speaker is trying to obey the rules conversation).

A: Will Sally be at the meeting this afternoon?

B: Her car broke down.

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Example: A 'standard' implicature (speaker is trying to obey the rules conversation).

A: Will Sally be at the meeting this afternoon?

B: Her car broke down.

> Sally won't be at the meeting.

The Cooperative Principle

Grice (1975) proposed the cooperative principle which means making your conversational contribution such as is required, at the stage at which it occurs, by the accepted purpose or direction of the talk exchange in which you are engaged (Yule, 1966). Thomas (1996) defines it as an attempt at explaining how a hearer gets from what is said to what it meant, from the level of expressed meaning to the level of implied meaning. In other words, the listener presumes that the speaker from both parties will normally seek to cooperate with each other to establish agreed meaning, that are speaking truthfully, informatively, relevantly, exactly, and appropriately.

The Maxims of the Cooperative Principle

Conversational implicatures are generated by a speaker's presumed obedience to Cooperative Principle. In short, these maxims specify what the participants have to do in order to converse in a maximally efficient, rational, cooperative way: they should speak sincerely, relevantly and clearly while providing sufficient information.

1. The maxims of Quantity

- Make your contribution as informative as is required (for the current purposes of the exchange).
- Give the right amount of information (not too little, not too much).
- Do not make your contribution one that is true.

Example:

A: Are you at the office?

B: Yes, I am. You will see me at room 12 of Halley building.

2. The maxims of Quality

- Try to say only what is true (don't say that for which you lack adequate evidence; don't say what you know to be false).

Example:

A: Do you think that smoking is good for health?

B: No, I think it's not good for our health.

.

3. The maxims of Relevance

- Make what you say relevant to the topic at hand (be relevant).

Example:

A: Why do you learn English?

B: Yes, I learn it because of my hobby.

4. The maxims of Manner

- Be clear (avoid ambiguity, avoid excessive wordiness, avoid obscurity of expression, be orderly, etc.).

Example:

A: What do you think about Ha Long Bay?

B: I like Ha Long Bay, it has a lot of beautiful caves.

.

Tests for Implicature

Grice (in Levinson, 1995) says that implicatures exhibit the following four major distinguishing properties:

- I. Cancellability (or defeasibility)
- II. Non – detachability (or inference based on meaning rather than form)
- III. Calculability
- IV. Non-conventionality

Tests for Implicature

Cancellability (or defeasibility)

Example:

(70) *Joe taunted Ralph and Ralph hit him.*

(71) *First Joe taunted Ralph and then Ralph hit him.*

(72) *Joe taunted Ralph and Ralph hit him, but not necessarily in that order.*

Levinson (1995:119) concludes that one of the attractions of implicature is that it would make unnecessary ambiguity claims.

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Tests for Implicature

Non – detachability

Sadock (in Levinson, 1995:119) points out, to test for non-detachability you have to have a set of synonymous expressions, which should share the same implicatures.

(73) some of the boys went to the soccer match.

(74) not all of the boys went to the soccer match.

(75) Some and perhaps all of the boys went to the soccer match.

So (73) and (75), being equivalent in meaning, should share the same implicatures. But they don't, since only (73) implicates (74).

Tests for Implicature

Calculability

Joe taunted Ralph and Ralph hit him.

But is substituted for *and* argues for a rejection of the ambiguity claim. Gazdar (in Levinson, 1995:120) suggests that some designated implicatures can cancel others. In (75) There is an additional implicature due to the phrase *perhaps all*.

Tests for Implicature

Non-conventionality

(79) *that man has two children*

(80) *the cloth is white*

(81) *that man has no more than two children*

(82) *the cloth is wholly white*

A further important feature of generalized conversational implicatures is that we would expect them to be universal.

.

Tests for Implicature

Implicature and Logical Form

Implicatures can not sensibly be derived from uninterpreted surface structures. There are many utterances that differ in surface structure but which share the same implicature.

(84) perhaps P

May be P

Possibly P

Potentially P

Note: P is any declarative sentence expressing the proposition P.

There is one obvious but important exception to the claim that implicatures make reference to semantic representation and truth conditions but not to surface structure.

Kinds of Implicature

- **Standard implicature**

Standard implicatures are derived from a simple assumption that the speaker is observing the maxims and derived in more complex ways on basis of speaker flouting or exploiting maxims.

- **Generalized implicature**

That arises without any particular context or special scenario being necessary.

- **Particularized implicature**

Do require such specific or special context scenario.

- **Conventional Implicature**

Conventional implicatures are *non-truth-condition inference* that is not derived from superordinate pragmatic principles like the maxims.

Generalized Implicature

It is a conversational implicature that is inferable without reference to a special context (no special knowledge is required to figure out the additional meaning). It means that a generalized conversational implicature is one which does not depend on particular features of the context, but is instead typically associated with the proposition expressed.

Example:

A leader asked a staff:

A: How do you feel about John these days?

B: He usually goes out late at night with someone who has a husband.

A: That's so bad. Do you know who that woman is?

B: Yes. She is his wife.

Generalized Implicature

To make generalized implicature understood better,
one should consider
two specific and important sub-cases:

- **scalar implicature**
- and **clausal Implicature.**

.

Scalar Implicature

Certain information is always communicated by choosing a word which expressed one value from a scale of value. The basic of scalar implicature is that when any form in a scale is asserted, the negative of all forms higher on the scale is implicated. This is particularly obvious in terms for expressing quantity.

Example:

(1) *I ate some of the cake.*

This sentence implies "I did not eat all of the cake".

(2) *Some of the boys went to the party.*

In the utterance (2), the word some implicates "not all of the boys went to the party."

The **words none, some, and all form an implicational scale**, in which the use of one form implicates that the use of a stronger form is not possible.

Clausal Implicature

If Sentences asserts some complex expression which contains an embedded sentence and neither entails nor presuppose and there's an alternative expression of roughly equal brevity which contains such than implicate that doesn't know whether is true or false.

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Particularized Implicatures

A particularized conversational implicature is the implicature that occurs when a conversation takes place in a very specific context in which locally recognized inferences are assumed. Special knowledge is required in special context in which speaker and hearer understand only. In another word, a particularized implicature is a conversational implicature that is derivable only in a specific context.

Particularized Implicatures

Example 1:

A: Where is my book?

B: Your young sister is drawing something.

The action "draw" of young sister would ordinarily not convey anything about her book, so implicature in this case depends on the context as well as the utterance itself.

Particularized Implicatures

Example 2:

A: What on earth has happened to the roast beef?

B: The dog is looking very happy.

In the above exchange, A will likely **derive the implicature** "the dog ate the roast beef" from B's statement. This is due to A's belief that B is observing the conversational maxim of relation or relevance in the specific context of A's question.

Particularized Implicatures

Example 3:

Vernon: Do you like Monica?

Bill: She's the cream in my coffee.

Bill's implicated message: yes, more than you know. Bill must be **speaking metaphorically**, and there must be a reason for doing so. A simple "yes" apparently wasn't enough. He's trying to tell Vernon that ordinary words can't express what he feels for Monica, so he's using a metaphor to indicate that his feelings are at another level.

Particularized Implicatures

Metaphor

Figure of speech containing an implied comparison, in which a word or phrase ordinarily and primarily used of one thing is applied to another. It is the exploitations or floutings of the maxim of quality. It is distinct from, but related to simile. The primary difference is that a simile uses the word 'like' or as to compare two things, while metaphor simply suggests that the dissimilar things are same.

Particularized Implicatures

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Particularized Implicatures

Metaphor

The purpose of Metaphors

- Expressions are used to give effect to a statement, the statement will be bland if it just uses the ordinary expression.
- Metaphors are meant to create an impact in the minds of readers.

Metaphor

The purpose of Metaphors

Examples:

- He drowned in a sea of grief.
- She is fishing in troubled waters.
- Sam is giant.
- The light of my life.
- Time is a thief.
- Feel blue.

In two implicatures, the particularized conversational implicature is used widely, because it can provide with more contents, more aspects of speech than generalized conversational implicature.

Accidentally or intentionally, the statement can create many implicatures and impacts on many people. At the same time, the troubles in conversation and the cases "one pulls one way, the other pulls the other way" occur.

Conventional Implicature

Conventional implicature is an implicature that is part of a lexical item's or expression's agreed meaning, rather than derived from principles of language use, and not part of the conditions for the truth of the item or expression. **It is not based on the cooperative principle or the maxims.** It does not have to occur in conversation. **It does not depend on special contexts for their interpretation.** It is associated with specific words and result in additional conveyed meanings when those words are used.

Conventional Implicature

Some words are expressions for conventional implicature:

1. **"but"**: "A but B" will be based on the relationship between A and B and an implicature of contrast between the information in A and B.

Example: (1) *Mary is crying but she is happy.*

"Mary is crying" is contrast to "she is happy"

(2) *Joe is poor but happy.*

This sentence implies poverty and happiness are not compatible but in spite of this Joe is still happy. This sentence will always necessarily imply *"Surprisingly Joe is happy in spite of being poor"*.

Conventional Implicature

Some words are expressions for conventional implicature:

2. **"even"**: implicature of contrast of "contrary to expectation"

Example: *David even helped the old woman to go home.*

This sentence implies David was not expected to help the old woman but he did.

Conventional Implicature

3. "yet": the present situation is expected to be different, perhaps the opposite, at a later time.

Example: *Mum has not gone home yet.*

This sentence implies negation of this sentence is "*Mum went home*". So "mum went home" is expected to be true later.

Implicature and Language Structure

Conversational implicature is a theory of language use. However, it has implications for the study of language structure. The linguistic description of morphemes and lexical items must at times refer to the notion of conversational implicature. Conversational implicature plays a major role in language change, **triggering** both syntactic and semantic change.

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H. P. Grice (1913–1988) was the first to systematically study cases in which **what a speaker means differs from what the sentence used by the speaker means.**

Consider (1).

(1) Alan: Are you going to Paul's party?

Barb: I have to work.

If this was a typical exchange, Barb meant that she is not going to Paul's party by saying that she has to work. She did not say that she is not going to Paul's party, and the sentence she uttered does not mean that. Grice introduced the technical terms *implicate* and *implicature* for the case in which what the speaker said is distinct from what the speaker thereby meant or implied.[1]

Thus Barb **implicated** that she is not going; that she is not going was her implicature.

H. P. Grice (1913–1988) was the first to systematically study cases in which **what a speaker means differs from what the sentence used by the speaker means.**

Consider (2).

In (2), Carla is a dispatcher in Denver, where it is sunny and dry. Don is a truck driver trying to get over the continental divide during a blizzard.

(2) Carla: How's the weather over there?

Don: The weather's lovely.

Don is using irony. He said that the weather is lovely, but he thereby meant that the weather is terrible. So he implicated that the weather is terrible. Implicating is an illocutionary speech act, something done in or by uttering words (Austin 1962: 98–103). Since it involves meaning one thing by saying something else, it is **an indirect speech act**, albeit not one that Searle (1975: 265–6) analyzed.[2]

By “saying”, Grice meant not the mere utterance of words, but saying that something is the case, **another illocutionary speech act**.

Barb could have said the same thing by uttering different words.

As Grice realized, “say” is used more or less strictly. [3]

Thus if Ed says “The largest planet is a gas giant”, we will sometimes count him as saying that Jupiter is a gas giant.

We will follow Grice in using “say” more narrowly, requiring that what a speaker says be something that the sentence uttered conventionally means (except when an indexical or ellipsis is used).

So we will **take Ed to have implicated that Jupiter is a gas giant by saying that the largest planet is**. Stating or asserting that p entails both saying and meaning that p. [4]

IMPLICATURES

भग तार

When Yogi Berra, famous for his malapropisms, said “Texas has a lot of electrical votes”, he said that Texas has a lot of electrical votes; but since that was not something he meant, it was not something he asserted. Don did not mean what he said for a different reason. So he too said but did not assert that the weather is lovely.

It is not possible to fully understand speakers without knowing what they have implicated as well as what they have said. Unless we know what Barb meant by saying that she has to work, we will not know that she has answered Alan’s question. Unless Carla knows what Don meant by saying that the weather is lovely, she might mistakenly infer that he will arrive on time. The difference between saying and implicating also affects how we evaluate speakers. If Barb knew she did not have to work, then she was lying in dialogue (1). If she knew she was going to Paul’s party, she might be guilty of misleading Alan, but not of lying or making a false statement.[5] In court, witnesses are typically required to answer questions directly. They cannot avoid perjury by implicating a falsehood rather than saying it.

What someone **implicates** is not given to us directly.

We **have to infer it** from evidence.

We would typically infer in (1) that Barb meant she is not going from what she said, what Alan asked, and our assumption that Barb was responding to Alan's question.

An implicature can be characterized as an inference (“something inferred”), but implicating is not itself inferring.

IMPLICATURES

भग तार

To implicate something is to express a belief in a particular way.

To infer something is to acquire or possess a belief in a particular way.

Hearers have to infer what speakers implicate.

This is not what makes implicating an indirect speech act.

Implicature is indirect because to implicate something is to mean it by saying something else.

To implicate something is to express a belief in a particular way.

Even though it requires an inference, our recognition of what is meant is commonly automatic and effortless, whether it is said or implicated.

In (1), for example, competent speakers will **grasp immediately** that Barb meant both that she has to work and that she is not going to Paul's party.

All speech acts have **to be inferred from contextual evidence**, including what was said and what words were uttered.

Whether there is any significant difference in the **kind of inference** required to recognize an implicature is a matter of some debate, and may depend on the type of implicature.

To implicate something is to express a belief in a particular way.

Conversational and Conventional Implicature

The implicatures in (1) and (2) are conversational. They depend on features of the conversational context, and are not determined by the conventional meaning of the sentences uttered.

A key feature in (1) was Alan's question. Had he asked "What are you going to do today?", Barb could have implicated something completely different (that she is going to work) by saying the same thing (that she has to work).

Grice (1975: 25) contrasted a **conversational implicature** with a **conventional implicature**, by which he meant one that is determined by the meaning of the sentence used. [7]

Conversational and Conventional Implicature

Here's a variant of Grice's example.

- (3) a. The queen is English and therefore brave.
- b. The queen is English and brave.
- c. Being brave follows from being English.

We will use parentheses to refer to the sentences in an example like (3), and brackets to refer to what the sentences express. So (3c) is the sentence “Being brave follows from being English” and [3c] is the proposition that being brave follows from being English. By using (3a) to say and mean [3a], speakers implicate [3c]. That is, by using (3a) to say and mean that the queen is English and therefore brave, speakers implicate that being brave follows from being English. They imply rather than say that being brave follows from being English.

Conversational and Conventional Implicature

Here's a variant of Grice's example.

(3) a. The queen is English and therefore brave.

b. The queen is English and brave.

c. Being brave follows from being English.

In contrast, (3b) would rarely if ever be used to implicate [3c].

The meaning of “therefore” generates the implicature of (3a).

Other words “triggering” conventional implicatures are but, even, too, still, yet, already, again, stop, start, know, and regret. [8]

Conversational and Conventional Implicature

While Grice's examples were triggered lexically, other conventional implicatures are triggered syntactically.

Speakers who assert Ravel, a Spaniard, wrote Spanish-style music implicate that Ravel was a Spaniard—they imply but do not say that Ravel was a Spaniard.

Hence their utterance is misleading but not a lie if they know Ravel was French.

The implicature is conventional in that it is determined by the meaning of the sentence via the appositive construction.

Other constructions that generate conventional implicatures are as-parentheticals (as a Spaniard) and parenthetical relative clauses (who was Spanish)

Explicature and Implicature

Grice (1975: 24) introduced the technical term “implicature” to denote either (i) the act of meaning or implying one thing by saying something else, or (ii) what the speaker meant or implied.

Grice (1975: 87ff) used “say” quite strictly, requiring what a speaker says to be closely related to what the sentence uttered means on that occasion. Indexicals provide cases in which what a speaker says is not what the sentence used means.

When Barb uttered “I have to work” in (1), she said that she, Barb, has to work; but the sentence she used does not mean “She, Barb, has to work” even on that occasion.

Ellipsis allows people to say things without even uttering sentences. If John asks “Where did Mary go?” and Sue answers “To the gym”, then Sue said that Mary went to the gym. The infinitive phrase she uttered was elliptical for a sentence meaning “Mary went to the gym” but does not itself mean that.

Explicature and Implicature

Sperber and Wilson (1986a: 182–3) introduced the parallel term **explicature** to mean what is “explicitly communicated”.

Carston (1988: 33) initially identified this with “what is said, in Grice’s terms”. [67]

On this definition, Barb’s **explicature in (1) was that she has to work,** and **her implicature was that she is not going to Paul’s party”.**

Carston’s (1988: 40) paradigm case is less clear.

(15) Alice ran to the edge of the cliff.

- a. Alice jumped.
- b. Alice jumped off the cliff.

Explicature and Implicature

After saying or observing that Alice ran to the edge of the cliff, a speaker would typically use (15a) “**Alice jumped**” to mean that **Alice jumped off the cliff** [15b]. Carston counts this an **explicature**.

It does resemble ellipsis, but a speaker who used (15a) to mean that Alice jumped up to the rescue helicopter said the same thing while meaning something different. And if the speaker knew that Alice jumped up to safety, **the speaker might be accused of misleading the hearer but not of lying**. Carston’s (1988: 45; 2004a: 646–8) most influential argument is based on what are commonly called **“embedded implicatures”**.

Explicature and Implicature

She would claim that if “Alice jumped off the cliff” were an implicature of “Alice jumped”, then we should not understand (16a) and (16b) as having the same truth conditions. Yet we do, Carston believes. The alleged implicature seems to fall within the scope of the logical operator, something she believes an implicature would not do.

Explicature and Implicature

(16)

- a. If Alice ran to the edge of the cliff and jumped, she is probably dead.
- b. If Alice ran to the edge of the cliff and jumped off, she is probably dead.

W. Davis (2016a: §5.3) replies as follows.

A speaker who used (15a) to mean [15b] would just as naturally use (16a) to mean [16b], and hearers would understand the speaker accordingly. But what the speaker said is not entailed by [16b]. What the speaker of (16a) said would be false in circumstances in which Alice was unlikely to jump off the cliff if she jumped. **Hearers would focus on what the speaker meant**, though, which would be true even in those circumstances.

Explicature and Implicature

(16)

- a. If Alice ran to the edge of the cliff and jumped, she is probably dead.
- b. If Alice ran to the edge of the cliff and jumped off, she is probably dead.

Since the speaker meant one thing [16b] by saying something else [16a], the speaker implicates [16b].

The speaker does not implicate anything by uttering the antecedent of (16a). The speaker says something only by uttering the whole conditional. So there is really no embedding of implicatures when (16a) is uttered.

Explicature and Implicature

(16)

- a. If Alice ran to the edge of the cliff and jumped, she is probably dead.
- b. If Alice ran to the edge of the cliff and jumped off, she is probably dead.

The relationship between (15) and (16) is special.

In many other cases in which a sentence “p” conversationally implicates “q”, the conditional “If p then r” does not implicate “If p and q then r”. For example, If Bill got some problems wrong, he might have gotten them all wrong does not implicate “If Bill got some but not all problems wrong, he might have gotten them all wrong”. A lively debate between Relevance theorists and neo-Griceans concerns numerical claims.

(17) Peter has one child.

- a. Peter has at least one child.
- b. Peter has exactly one child..

Explicature and Implicature

(17) Peter has one child.

- a. Peter has at least one child.
- b. Peter has exactly one child.

All parties agree that a speaker can use (17) to mean either [17a] or [17b]. Horn (1972) and Levinson (2000: 87–90) further agree with Carston that (17) itself is unambiguous. But whereas the neo-Griceans hold that (17) means [17a] rather than [17b], Carston (1988: 46–7) maintains that (17) **means neither but can be used to say both**.

So the neo-Griceans hold that (17) always says [17a] while sometimes implicating [17b].

Carston holds that (17) is sometimes used to explicate [17a] and sometimes [17b]; **neither is an implicature**.

The thesis that sentence meaning leaves open what is said to this extent is called **semantic underdetermination**.

Explicature and Implicature

While still doubting that Carston's view can fully account for cardinals, Horn (1989: 250–1; 2010: 314–5) now concludes that they do not behave like quantifiers. For example, if you know that everyone passed, you must answer “Did some students pass?” with “Yes”. But if you know that Peter has two children, you cannot answer “Does Peter have one child?” without knowing whether the speaker meant “at least” or “exactly”.

Indeed, a strong case can be made that (17) is ambiguous, so that Neo-Gricean and Relevance accounts are both wrong. Following Sperber & Wilson (1986a: 182), Carston (2004b: 635) later defines **an explicature** as a development of a logical form encoded by the sentence uttered, and an implicature as any proposition communicated by an utterance that is not an explicature.[69] The technical terms “development” and “logical form” are understood in such a way that [15b] is a development of [15a]. Thus understood, “**explicature**” covers much more than what is said, and “**implicature**” covers much less than what is implicated as defined in §1.

Bach (1994: 160) uses “say” even more strictly than Grice, meaning “strictly, literally, and explicitly say”. Since the speaker of (15a) did not explicitly say [15b], Bach counts “The speaker said that Alice jumped off the cliff” as false. Bach (1994: 125–6, 140–1; 2006: 28–9) agrees with Carston, though, in withholding the term “implicature” when what the speaker means is an “expansion” or “completion” of what is said.

Bach introduces the term *implicature* (with “i” rather than “a” after soft “c”) to cover such cases.

Bach restricts “implicature” to cases in which what is meant is “completely separate” from what is said.

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Bach restricts “implicature” to cases in which what is meant is “completely separate” from what is said.

A thesis attributed to Grice is that what S says is determined by “decoding”, while what S conversationally implicates is determined by what S says together with an inferential, pragmatic mechanism (see, e.g., Sperber & Wilson 1986a: 182). An alleged problem, called “Grice’s Circle” (Levinson 2000: 173–4, 186–7), is that many of the processes involved in figuring out what is said, such as reference identification and ambiguity resolution, “involve exactly those inferential mechanisms that characterize Gricean pragmatics”.[70] Grice never talked about decoding however, and observed himself that conversational principles are involved in determining what is said (Grice 1957: 222).

For example, if an ambiguous term is used, we naturally assume—in the absence of specific counterevidence—that the intended meaning is the one relevant to the conversation.

In a discussion of snow, “There is a large bank on Main Street” is naturally interpreted as referring to a snow bank.

There is no circle on Grice’s view because what is said is the conclusion of one pragmatic inference, and is one of the premises in a further pragmatic inference to what is implicated.[71] The process is serial rather than parallel, although later conclusions may always lead to adjustment of earlier conclusions.

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Geoffrey Leech Politeness Principle


CHECK YOURSELF!

<https://learningapps.org/display?v=pvywyzihk20>



Erving Goffman: On Face-Work: An analysis of Ritual Social Interaction

- The concept of face:
 - The presentation of the self to the other.
 - Could be in positive or negative terms.
- Everyday terms
 - Maintaining face, Loose Face, Wrong face, Out of face, Poise, Save face, Give face
 - **Line**: a specific type of face in a specific situation.
- Basic structural feature of social interaction.



FACE

The concept of face was derived from Chinese into English in the 19th century.

“Face” can be conceptualized as an individual’s positive claim of social values in socializing contact was introduced into academia by Erving Goffman through his theories of "face" and "**facework**".

Goffman, Erving. 1955. On Face-Work: An analysis of ritual elements in social interaction, *Psychiatry: Journal of Interpersonal Relations* 18:3, pp. 213–231.

FACE

According to Brown and Levinson's assumption in politeness theory based on Goffman's “face”, one's face is categorized into two forms: positive and negative.

Brown and Levinson defined positive face two ways: as "the want of every member that his wants be desirable to at least some others executors" (p. 62),

or alternatively, "the positive consistent self-image or 'personality' (crucially including the desire that this self-image be appreciated and approved of) claimed by interactants" (p. 61).

FACE

Negative face was defined as "the want of every 'competent adult member' that his actions be unimpeded by others", or "the basic claim to territories, personal preserves, rights to non-distraction—i.e. the freedom of action and freedom from imposition". Whereas **positive face** involves a desire for connection with others, negative face needs include autonomy and independence.

Brown, Penelope and Stephen C. Levinson. 1987. *Politeness: Some universals in language usage*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. [First published 1978 as part of Esther N. Goody (ed.): *Questions and Politeness*. Cambridge University Press]

FACE

Brown characterized **positive face** by desires to be liked, admired, ratified, and related to positively, noting that one would **threaten positive face by ignoring someone**. At the same time, she characterized **negative face** by the desire not to be imposed upon, noting that **negative face** could be impinged upon by imposing on someone.

Positive face refers to one's self-esteem, while **negative face refers** to one's freedom to act.

FACE

These **two aspects of face** are the basic wants in any social interaction; during any social interaction.

So a certain sort of cooperation is needed amongst the participants **to maintain each other's face**.

Participants can do this by using **positive politeness** and **negative politeness**, which pay attention to people's positive and negative face needs respectively.

FTA

A face threatening act is an act that inherently damages the face of the addressee or the speaker by acting in opposition to the wants and desires of the other.

FTA

Face threatening acts can be

- (1) verbal (using words/language),
- (2) paraverbal (conveyed in the characteristics of speech such as tone etc.),
- (3) or non-verbal (facial expression, etc.).

Negative face-threatening acts

Negative face is threatened when an individual does not avoid or intend to avoid the **obstruction of their interlocutor's freedom of action**.

It can cause damage to either the speaker or the hearer, and makes one of the interlocutors submit their will to the other.

Freedom of choice and action are impeded when negative face is threatened.

Negative face-threatening acts

Examples of negative FTA damaging the Hearer:
orders, requests, suggestions, advice, reminders,
threats, or warnings.

Stop it!

You can't touch this!

How can you say that?

Listen to me, guy!

Don't forget to say "Thank you"!

Don't go!

You'd better shut your mouth...

Positive face-threatening acts

Positive face is threatened when the speaker or hearer does not care about their interactor's feelings, wants, or does not want what the other wants.

Positive face threatening acts can also cause damage to the speaker or the hearer.

When an individual is forced to be separated from others so that their well being is treated less importantly, positive face is threatened.

Positive face-threatening acts

Examples of positive FTA damaging the Hearer: disapproval, criticism, contempt or ridicule, complaints and reprimands, accusations, insults.

It could be an act that expresses the speaker's indifference toward the addressee's positive face.

Positive face-threatening acts

Examples of positive FTA damaging the Speaker:
It could be an act that shows that the speaker is in some sense wrong, has own dignity offended, or unable to control himself.

Politeness strategies

Politeness strategies are used to formulate messages in order to save the hearer's positive face when face-threatening acts are inevitable or desired.

Brown and Levinson outline four main types of politeness strategies:

- I. bald on-record,
- II. negative politeness,
- III. positive politeness,
- IV. and off-record (indirect)
- V. as well as simply not using the face-threatening act.

Brown and Levinson Politeness Principle

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Face-work

- **Rule of self respect:**
 - One is expected to maintain face
- **Rule of considerateness:**
 - person must go to certain lengths to save the feelings and the face of others present.
- **The Face-Threatening Act.**
 - Something that does damage to one's face.
- **Face Work:**
 - Maintaining face; correcting damage
 - Often habitualized, Cultural variation, Individual variation

Basic Kinds of Facework

- **Total avoidance** to avoid possible FTA
- **Defensive measures:** avoidance; Shift topics; suppress feelings; hedging feelings, ...
- **Protective maneuvers:**
 - Show respect and politeness; Show discretion about feelings on topics that might embarrass others; Employs circumlocutions and deceptions; Employs courtesies; joking manner; neutralize offending activities by explaining them in advance.
- **Denial** of FTA or the face threatening nature of the incident.
- **Loss of control** (ironically) others may protectively turn away from him to give him time to assemble himself.

The Corrective Process

When participants find themselves in an established state of ritual disequilibrium or disgrace, and an attempt is made to re-establish a satisfactory ritual state for them.

- **Ritual: one's face is a sacred thing**
- **The Stages**
 - **Acknowledgement:** Begins with acknowledge threat to face.
(The interchange: seems to be a basic concrete unit of social activity.)
 - **The challenge:** participants call attention to the misconduct
 - **The offering:** whereby a participant, typically the offender, is given a chance to correct for the offence and re-establish the expressive order.
 - explain as a meaningless act, a joke, unintentional, a mistake, unavoidable, not acting himself, under the influence of something or somebody
 - **The acceptance** (or not) by the offended of offering
 - **Gratitude** by the offender (ritual equilibrium re-established)

Variations

- The offender patently refuses to heed the warning and continues with the offending behavior.
- Possibly calling offended's bluff: Untenable position because face for offender cannot be derived from it.
 - The offender withdraws in a visible huff (showing righteous indignation)
 - Emotions play an important part in this process.
 - both ways of salvaging face, but with high costs
- Some cultures apologize freely others with reluctance.
 - The Liberian apology:
 - I'm sorry your feelings were hurt when I said that.

The Game

- Every face-saving practice which is allowed to neutralize a particular threat opens up the possibility that the threat will be willfully introduced for what can be gained by it.
 - If a person knows that his modesty will be answered by other's praise for him, he can fish for complements.
 - He can arrange for favorable events to appear.
 - Sudden withdrawal leading to need for repair.
- Cooperation in face-work

The Ritual Roles of the Self: Two senses:

- The self as an image pieced together from the expressive implication of the full flow of events in an undertaking;
- The self as a player [agent] in a ritual game who copes honorably or dishonorably, diplomatically or undiplomatically, with the judgmental contingencies of the situation.
- Add this perspective to the view of the Self by G.H. Mead.
- Human need to be social

Greetings and Leave-taking

- How are greetings and leave-takings relevant to Goffman?
- Leave-takings are face threatening.
- Two ways to say good by
 - Blessing: Sidong fayn (CP), Adieu,
 - Will see again. Ma lo sina hoe (Mende) Au Revoir, See ya later.
- Greetings (Has our relationship changed since we last met?)
- What about Aloha and Ciao which mean both hello and good bye?

So what?

- Universal human nature is not a very human thing. By acquiring it, the person becomes a kind of construct, built up, not from inner psychic propensities, but from moral rules that are impressed upon him from without.
- The general capacity to be bound by moral rules may well belong to the individual, but the particular set of rules which transforms him into a human being derives from requirements established in the ritual organization of social encounters. [*the social contract*]
- Similarly, the human nature of a particular set of persons may be specifically designed for the special kind of undertakings in which they participate [e.g., cultural variation].
- Similarities between Goffman and Grice

Politeness: Brown and Levinson

- Assumptions
- Based on Goffman's concept of face
 - Face: The public self-image that every member wants to claim for himself.
 - A communication (speech act) may contain an imposition on the “face” of the Hearer.
- Language Universals extend beyond the confines of grammar.

Two types of face: Positive and Negative

- **Positive Face: Honor**

- The public self.
- The positive consistent self-image or 'personality' (crucially including the desire that this self-image be appreciated and approved of) by interactants.
- the want of every member that his wants be desirable to at least some others.

- Similar to the perspective of "me" of Mead,
- The "honor" of Weber.

- **Negative Face: Privacy**

- Invented by Brown and Levinson
- The concept of the right to privacy.
- The basic claim to territories, personal preserves, rights to non-distraction
- the want of every 'competent adult member' that his actions be unimpeded by others.

- Similar to the perspective of the "I" of Mead
- Similar to freedom of action and freedom of imposition.

Intrinsic FTAs

- It follows that “certain kinds of acts intrinsically threaten face ... when they “run contrary to the wants of the addressee or speaker.

First Distinction: Kinds of face threatened

- **S threatens H's Negative Face [imposition]**
- Those that put pressure on H to act: Orders and Requests; Suggestions and Advice; Reminders; Threats and warnings.
- Those that put H in debt (offers, promises)
- Those that expression desire or envy of H's possessions which lead H to think that he has to protect them (complements, envy, expressions of strong emotion (hatred, anger, lust))
- **S threatens H's Positive face**
- negative evaluation: disapproval(criticism); disagreement
- indifference to H's positive face: violent emotions (reason to fear S); irreverence; bad news about H (good news about S); raising divisive topics (politics); non-cooperation; wrong terms of address

Second distinctions:

Threats to H's face versus threats to S's

- **Those that offend S's negative Face**
- S expressing thanks, S acceptance of H's thanks; S's excuses; S acceptance of offers; S's response to H's faux pas; unwilling promises and offers
- **Those that damage S's positive face**
- apologies; acceptance of a complement; breakdown of physical control, self-humiliation, confessions, emotional leakage

Strategies for doing FTAs	On Record (directly Communicating the FTA directly and unequivocally (I promise to ...))	Without redressive action, baldly	
		With redressive action Redress: action that gives face to addressee by attempting to counteracting the potential face damage of the FTE	Positive politeness Oriented toward the positive face of H [honor]
			Negative politeness Oriented toward redressing the negative face [privacy]
	Off Record (indirect): This strategy: involves some ambiguity so that H is not obligated to respond (Damn, I'm out of cash cf. Grice.		
Don't do the FTA			

Sociological variables (331)

- Computing the Weightiness of an FTA
- $W_x = D(S,H) + P(H,S) + R_x$
- D = Social Distance between S and H for the purposes of that act and as determined by such things as the frequency of interaction and the kinds of material and nonmaterial goods exchanged....
- P = Power differential (Weber's sense). Degree to which H can impose his own plans and own face at the expense of S's plans and face.
- "I think you will take me to the store."

Conclusion: Pragmatics

- Austin: Speech Acts (Illocutionary Acts)
 - The linkages of these acts with institutions (Bourdieu).
 - The range of vocabulary in any language that have to do with speech acts.
- Grice: The Cooperative Principle and conversational Maxims
 - A Universal that is pragmatically grounded
 - Helps explain implicature and variation
- Goffman: Face
 - Activities involved in the presentation of self
 - Pragmatically based universal
- Brown and Levinson: Politeness (positive and negative face)
 - Types of strategies for interaction.
 - Positivistic rules. (structuralist?)
 - Universals versus cultural variation?

Extended Summary

Ricoeur	Structuralism v Post structuralism	The dialectical relationship between langue and parole
Mead	Symbolic Interactionism	The role of language The socially constructed self
Berger & Luckmann	Basis for institutions	The importance of the face to face interaction.
Austin	Illocutionary Acts	Connection of words with institutions.
Grice	CP and Maxims	Uses of implicature
Goffman	Face	Importance of face work to humans
Tannen	Frames, Schema and Knowledge	Elaboration of Discourse
Fairclough	Power/Ideology	The inclusion of power and ideology in the analysis of texts.

Recommended Reading

- Grice H.P. (1975), “Logic and Conversation”, in Cole & Morgan 1975: 41–58. Reprinted in Grice 1989: 22–40.

Link: [Grice1975.doc \(sfu.ca\)](#)

- PRAGMATICS by George Yule

Link: [PRAGMATICS George Yule 1 DEFINITIONS AND \(present5.com\)](#)

- The Study of Language by George Yule (2006), pp. 112-123.

<https://drive.google.com/file/d/0B0c54RghLyIwU3JPRINIZ0hhWGc/view>

Highly Recommended Reading

- Brown, Penelope and Stephen C. Levinson. 1987. *Politeness: Some universals in language usage*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. [First published 1978 as part of Esther N. Goody (ed.): Questions and Politeness. Cambridge University Press.]
- Goffman, Erving. 1955. On Face-Work: An analysis of ritual elements in social interaction, *Psychiatry: Journal of Interpersonal Relations* 18:3, pp. 213–231.
- John Searle (1975) "Indirect speech acts." *ibid*. Reprinted in *Pragmatics: A Reader*, ed. S. Davis, pp. 265–277. Oxford: Oxford University Press. (1991)

भग तार



Have a big time!

Thank you!